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Governance in the Bronx, U.S.A.
By: Julissa Reynoso*
Abstract
This Article summarizes how community-based organizing
and local government are breaking with hierarchical systems and
are engaged in novel forms of problem-solving under an evolving
experimentalist and pragmatist framework. To illustrate, the
Article traces the co-evolution of the New York City Department of
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), a public
regulatory agency with a mandate to preserve low-income and
affordable rental housing and enforce a local housing code, and of
the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (Northwest
Bronx), a Saul Alinsky-style grassroots community-based
organization founded to organize marginalized neighborhoods in
response to urban housing decay and abandonment. HPD's
hierarchical control of the buildings it owned gave way to a new
system of early detection and prevention of deterioration in
privately owned housing. This new system relies on local, street-
level information pooled by seasoned community-based
organizations like Northwest Bronx with an objective of building
neighborhood-based, countervailing power.
The argument is that this new relationship between local
government and community-based organizations makes public
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problem-solving more workable because community-based
organizations like Northwest Bronx are one natural focal point for
the development of stakeholder participation and the elaboration
of pragmatic solutions to public problems. The case study will
illustrate how community-based organizations are moving beyond
demanding public sector reform and towards a novel form of
conflictual participation in the design, revision and
implementation of the policies and regulations of local
government.
Introduction
During the second game of the 1977 World Series between
the Yankees and Dodgers, Howard Cosell of ABC News directed
the cameras away from the baseball game and towards a burning
building near Yankee Stadium in the South Bronx.1 Cosell then
announced to the nation, "there it is, ladies and gentlemen, the
Bronx is burning."2 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Bronx exemplified
the urban decay of American neighborhoods. The Bronx was
particularly affected by a tide of arson and property abandonment
that created a housing crisis.3 By the 1990s, however, the Bronx
was rebounding. 4 Today, the Bronx is in many ways a model of
urban growth.
A key piece of this turnaround story concerns the co-evolution
of two entities: the New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development (HPD), a public regulatory agency
which has directives to preserve low-income and affordable rental
housing and to enforce a local housing code, and the Northwest
Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (Northwest Bronx), a Saul
Alinsky-style5 grassroots community-based organization (CBO)
founded to organize marginalized neighborhoods in response to
urban housing decay and property abandonment.6 Through this
1. JONATHAN MAHLER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE BRONX IS BURNING:
1977, BASEBALL, POLITICS, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF A CITY 330 (2005).
2. Id.
3. See generally JILL JONNES, SOUTH BRONX RISING: THE RISE, FALL AND
RESURRECTION OF THE SOUTH BRONX (2002); Arson Destroying New York Housing
at a Record Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1980, at Al; David Reiss, Housing
Abandonment and New York City's Response, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
783, 787 (1996) (describing the deterioration of the Bronx).
4. See generally JONNES, supra note 3 (detailing in context the present status
of the Bronx).
5. See infra note 102-111 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Section III. Though HPD and Northwest Bronx are situated in
New York City, this new form of governance is developing in communities
throughout the United States. See KAVITHA MEDIRATTA, INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION
[Vol. 24:213
PUTTING OUT FIRES
ongoing co-evolution, HPD focuses less on owning and
administering public housing and more on detecting and
preventing the deterioration of the existing stock of affordable
rental housing.7 Part of this transformation, in turn, involves
increasingly close cooperation with Northwest Bronx in identifying
and fixing at-risk housing.8 The HPD is finding new ways to
monitor and increase compliance with public laws and preserve
affordable housing by integrating stakeholders like Northwest
Bronx into its problem-solving process.9 At the grassroots level,10
Northwest Bronx relies less on purely adversarial tactics to impose
its preferences on public authorities and more on its grassroots
knowledge to find and administer innovative solutions to city-wide
housing problems, while gaining public power and holding local
government accountable." Cooperating with local government has
not limited Northwest Bronx's ability to use, when necessary, its
independent countervailing power to criticize and pressure HPD. 12
The result of this ongoing joint transformation is a less
hierarchical public administration and a less confrontational, but
not more docile, community organization.
The mutual changes in the HPD and Northwest Bronx are
not unique. On the contrary, they arguably illustrate a broad
movement away from command-and-control governance, with all
the familiar adversarial politics that go with it, toward a set of
more collaborative "experimentalist" practices. 13 The traditional
AND SOCIAL POLICY, CONSTITUENTS OF CHANGE: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION REFORM 17 (2004), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/iesp/publications/cip/ConstituentsofChange.pdf (illustrating
this new form of engagement between community-based organizing and
government agencies in education reform efforts throughout the United States).
7. See infra Section I.
8. See infra Section III.
9. See infra Section III.
10. Throughout this Article, "community-based organizing" and "grassroots
organizing" will be used interchangeably.
11. See infra Section II. Another example of this type of innovative CBO is the
Industrial Areas Foundation (JAF) in the Southwest. See Paul Osterman,
Organizing the US Labor Market: National Problems, Community Strategies, in
GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY 240, 251 (Jonathan Zeitlin &
David M. Trubek eds., 2003). Similarly to Northwest Bronx, the IAF is rooted in
the organizing principles of Saul Alinsky, emphasizing civic participation and
distribution of power. Id. at 251-53. The IAF is addressing low-income labor
markets by developing new forms of job training programs through an initiative
called Project Quest. Id. at 254. Project Quest brings together government and
local community groups in building worker capacity. Id. at 254-64.
12. See infra Section III.
13. See generally Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative
Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
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command-and-control system is marked by a centralized authority
that set specific rules and prescribed inputs for regulated public
goods with little or no local stakeholder feedback except through
the traditional forms of local politics. 14  Under this model,
government-set rules are presumed to be at least workably
definitive. 15  In contrast, under an experimentalist regime,
government procedures explicitly allow public agencies and
stakeholders such as Northwest Bronx to revise norms in the light
of lessons jointly learned, in the process, creating and revising
standards for measuring performance to discipline the public good
and ensure accountability.16 This case study will demonstrate how
local government and CBOs are engaging in these new practices,
creating new spaces for stakeholder participation.
This Article is divided into four sections. Section I
summarizes the evolution of local housing regulation and
preservation in New York City. Beginning in the 1970s, in
response to a housing abandonment crisis that swept New York
City, HPD began taking possession of delinquent and neglected
private housing units in in rem foreclosure proceedings. HPD soon
accumulated an unmanageably vast inventory of distressed
properties and properties in code violation and had to rethink its
housing preservation and anti-abandonment strategies. By the
1990s, faced with its inability to directly manage the city's housing
stock, HPD divested itself of most properties and began developing
an elaborate system of property anti-abandonment that directly
linked stakeholders like Northwest Bronx with the HPD
bureaucracy.
Today's HPD emphasizes prevention. Information pooling
and process changes eliminate and reduce the possibility of
property abandonment by identifying and tackling the problem
when the quality of housing starts to deteriorate, rather than
when the housing becomes unlivable and is abandoned. HPD, in
collaboration with private intermediaries and CBOs, is creating an
early warning anti-abandonment system that tracks landlord
delinquencies, makes information on problem landlords available
to CBOs, and emphasizes new building-wide inspection programs
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (literature on democratic
experimentalism).
14. Sabel & Simon, supra note 13, at 1019.
15. Id. at 1021.
16. Id. at 1019-20.
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coordinated with interested CBOs that have a more
comprehensive, local understanding of the problem's dynamics.
Section II describes the transformation of Northwest Bronx.
Northwest Bronx was founded in reaction to New York City's
1970s housing crisis as a decentralized coalition of parishes and
neighborhood associations with a mission of building street-level
countervailing power. As part of its mission, the organization
demanded from public authorities greater oversight of delinquent
landlords and increased community investment. Saul Alinsky
organizations like Northwest Bronx typically used adversarial,
zero-sum tactics in their approach to politics and organizing.
With time, Northwest Bronx developed an elaborate political
and leadership training system that helped impart a sophisticated
knowledge of complex housing issues to its membership base.
Northwest Bronx also became a housing preservation innovator,
increasingly partnering with HPD while demanding a seat at the
table with its administrators. Northwest Bronx has created a
community-driven system of building-monitoring through which
organizers develop lists of specific problem landlords and appraise
building conditions. This monitoring system has influenced HPD's
policies and norms as it focuses on preventing the deterioration of
existing private housing stock. Meanwhile, Northwest Bronx has
periodically reconfigured its internal politics and procedures to
accommodate its changing roles and practices, becoming more
democratic. Today, Northwest Bronx preserves its original
mandate of organizing tenants and developing local leadership
while pioneering a model of community-based organizing in which
the organization is directly involved in solving housing problems,
not just demanding public sector reform.
Section III describes how Northwest Bronx and HPD are
exercising their evolving roles in relation to one another and
engaging in ongoing deliberative practices that have the potential
to further transform the internal and external dynamics of both
institutions. Their mutual though incomplete restructuring has
allowed HPD and Northwest Bronx to engage in a process of
information diffusion and absorption that elaborates new norms of
problem-solving. Northwest Bronx's and HPD's recent
interactions in dealing with lending institutions, landlords, and
code enforcement illustrate this pattern. Northwest Bronx has a
trademark strategy of targeting and publicly exposing banks that
finance problem landlords. HPD increasingly is aware of how vital
Northwest Bronx's practices of monitoring banks and landlords
are to its own regulatory and administrative practices. It is telling
2006]
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that in recent years HPD has taken steps to defend Northwest
Bronx when landlords attempt to enjoin Northwest Bronx from
organizing tenants and registering property conditions.
Although such collaborations in targeting problem landlords
are promising, Northwest Bronx insists that HPD is not doing
enough to penalize delinquent landlords who fail to comply with
the housing code. Code enforcement remains an issue of great
contention between the city and Northwest Bronx. Over the last
two years, HPD has slowly responded to Northwest Bronx's
demands and has taken steps toward directly involving Northwest
Bronx in creating new policies to resolve the persistent difficulties
with housing code enforcement. Specifically, HPD and Northwest
Bronx have been creating a community-driven tenant petition
inspection program and a comprehensive system of monitoring
building quality. The new policy incorporates stakeholders like
Northwest Bronx directly into the housing code compliance
process, creating the possibility for the mutual transformation of
HPD's and Northwest Bronx's working practices and internal and
external politics.
Section IV summarizes how the co-evolution of HPD and
Northwest Bronx illustrates a movement away from command-
and-control governance toward new experimentalist and
pragmatic approaches to public administration, with grassroots
organizations playing an integral role in instigating reform and in
informing policy results. In the context of housing policy reform in
New York City, for example, policy and regulatory reforms have
been prompted by both political and organizing efforts, without
public law litigation playing a significant role. This Section claims
that the way CBOs and local government are breaking with old
systems and linking under this evolving experimentalist
framework makes public problem-solving more workable. The
government is not solely relying on data and figures and reacting
to crisis but is relying on street-level indicators and local
knowledge in its efforts to prevent housing abandonment and code
violations. Under this evolving model, CBOs like Northwest
Bronx, manifesting post-Alinsky characteristics, are one natural
focal point for the development of stakeholder participation and
the elaboration of pragmatic solutions to public problems. This
model also gives local government more legitimacy since it directly
involves the citizens it represents.
This Article asserts that grassroots organizations like
Northwest Bronx are using their organizing and mobilizing power
to effect regulation and policy in novel ways. Regular citizens,
[Vol. 24:213
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instead of demanding government's intervention in fixing
problems, increasingly are engaged in pooling information in order
to solve specific problems and inform norms. These are
experimentalist practices that have the potential to change the
democratic process and heighten public accountability.
This Article presents evidence that local government and
CBOs are undergoing co-evolutionary changes, breaking from the
past in significant ways and unsettling past methods in response
to old organizational and governance problems. Although this
case study highlights certain empirical details of a break with old
systems and the emergence of new experimentalist and pragmatic
approaches to organizing and public administration, tensions and
inconsistencies between the new and old approaches remain.
Indeed, the CBO and government agency highlighted here fell
more or less reluctantly into this joint innovation and are not
likely to characterize this process exactly the way I do here.' 7 This
Article is a preliminary attempt at both describing and
conceptualizing an ongoing transformation and an emergent
system.
I. HPD and Signs of an Evolving Public Institution
A. An Overview of Old Strategies: 1960s-1990sI'
In the late 1960s and 1970s, New York City began
experiencing a housing abandonment crisis. An exodus of
residents and a massive wave of disinvestment swept urban New
York. 19  Arson, terrible building conditions, and property
abandonment became severe problems as rents plummeted,
landlord costs rose, and units went vacant. 20  A unique
combination of factors triggered this housing crisis.2' Government
policies that subsidized mortgages and accelerated development of
alternative housing outside of highly concentrated urban areas
created a massive demographic shift that replaced longtime
17. For example, I describe the Northwest Bronx as manifesting post-Alinsky
characteristics, yet certain members of the Northwest Bronx do not agree with this
categorization.
18. Much of this Section was obtained from interviews and research conducted
by Douglas Jaffe.
19. Christopher J. Mired, Breaking the Cycle of Abandonment 1 (2000),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpdldownloads/pdflbgc winner.pdf.
20. See Reiss, supra note 3, at 786-87; Arson Destroying New York Housing at
Record Rate, supra note 3.
21. See Allred, supra note 19, at 1.
20061
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residents, the stable backbone of the urban communities, with
large numbers of lower income residents.22 The new residents
were less able to absorb increases in rent, and when landlords
were squeezed by rising costs from skyrocketing heating oil prices
and inflation, buildings became unprofitable.23 As a result, by the
mid-1970s, New York City faced a property abandonment crisis,
with more than a fifth of the city's multifamily residential
properties in arrears and many properties facing foreclosure.24
The Bronx was one of the most devastated New York City
boroughs. 25 As long-time residents left, rent rolls declined, and the
operating costs of the buildings began to exceed the income they
generated. 26 Coupled with racist redlining practices27 and vast
disinvestment, the result was a dramatic decline in the Bronx's
real estate market. 28 Landlords began to defer maintenance,
resulting in the deterioration of building conditions.29 As the
exodus continued, landlords eventually stopped paying property
taxes, often abandoning the buildings altogether.30 In some cases,
buildings were burned in an attempt to recover insurance money. 1
A major wave of arson swept from the south to the north Bronx in
the 1970s, and as late as the 1980s, arson continued to be a
serious problem in the Bronx.32
The city's response was to step in as landlord and attempt to
manage the abandoned housing stock.33 The New York City
Council passed Local Law 45 in 1976 authorizing in rem tax
foreclosure by the city against delinquent properties.3 4 In 1976,
22. See David W. Dunlap, Bronx Housing Devastation Found Slowing
Substantially, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1982, at Al.
23. Allred, supra note 19, at 1.
24. Reiss, supra note 3, at 787.
25. See Dunlap, supra note 22, at Al; Reiss, supra note 3, at 788-89.
26. See Reiss, supra note 3, at 786.
27. See Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and
Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1169-70 (1998)
(arguing that the Federal Housing Administration's redlining policies provided loan
subsidies to White neighborhoods at the expense of Black and Latino
neighborhoods from the 1940s through the 1970s).
28. See Allred, supra note 19, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Arson Destroying New York Housing at a Record Rate, supra note 3, at Al.
32. Id.; Dunlap, supra note 22, at Al.
33. Reiss, supra note 3, at 787-88. Because local governments have power over
land use issues, they have tremendous influence over housing development policy.
See Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State
Housing Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 446 (2003).
34. Reiss, supra note 3, at 787; see N.Y.C., NY ADMIN. CODE § 11-412 (1976).
[Vol. 24:213
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the city also created the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development to replace the Housing Development Administration
as the city's principal housing administrator.35 HPD soon acquired
jurisdiction for the daily administration of all residential city-
owned properties. 36
These steps had mixed results. As back taxes and code
violations accumulated, the city took possession of the delinquent
buildings in in rem foreclosure proceedings, rapidly swelling the
city-controlled housing stock.3 7 The city was unable or unwilling
to properly rehabilitate and manage all of these neglected units,
and the crisis for the remaining residents grew.38 Like the
landlords that it was supposed to be regulating, the city was
struggling with its own vast inventory of distressed properties and
properties in code violation.39 Abandonment remained a chronic
problem throughout the 1980s, and HPD continued to accumulate
properties. 40
In 1988, New York City owned and managed approximately
9,500 buildings with 100,000 units under its authority.4 1 The city
recognized that tremendous capital resources were needed to
rehabilitate these buildings. By 1994, city ownership of in rem
properties lasted for an average of nineteen years,"2 "while the
foreclosed properties had an average tax delinquency of $36,000 at
vesting, the City spent an average of $2.2 million to acquire,
manage, repair, and dispose of each vested building. 43
Cumulatively, New York City was burdened with an estimated
total cost of $10.6 billion for these properties, excluding the
foregone tax revenues from tax delinquencies. 44
In addition to housing stock challenges, by the 1990s the city
35. Reiss, supra note 3, at 788.
36. Id.




41. Eric Hirsch & Peter Wood, Squatting in New York City: Justification and
Strategy, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 605, 610 (1987-88); see also Allred,
supra note 19, at 2-3 ("By 1994, the City owned and managed 5,458 buildings -
most were dilapidated multi-family housing occupied by a low-income
population ... [New York City's] in rem stock ... consist[ed] of 51,672 units ... of
which [seventy-five] percent were occupied."). Today, the city's housing stock
consists of approximately 3,300 units. Interview with Bill Traylor, former Deputy
Commissioner for Development, HPD, in New York, NY (Mar. 3, 2004).
42. Allred, supra note 19, at 3.
43. Id. New York City retained the consulting firm of Arthur Anderson to audit




also faced tremendous pressure from the federal government when
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
eliminated the issuance of new Section 8 subsidies in the form of
certificates and vouchers.45  The city used Section 8 both to
stabilize rent increases and to subsidize the operation of HPD
programs. 46 Section 8 subsidies also prevented displacement from
rent increases resulting from capital improvements to occupied,
privately owned properties.4 7 Faced with these circumstances,
HPD was forced to reinvent itself.45
B. New Strategies and the Quest to End the City's Landlord
Status
1. Legislation and the Third Party Transfer Initiative
New York City began its new intervention efforts in 1986
when Mayor Edward Koch announced a ten-year, $4.2 billion
rehabilitation program. 49 Koch's initiative was criticized for being
underfunded and for not generating enough new units0 In 1994,
the HPD administration gathered a group of policy experts to
determine a more comprehensive, effective strategy to deal with
the challenges of affordable housing and the city's ownership and
management of large numbers of tax delinquent residential
properties. 5 1 The group "recommended that the city sell the liens
on all tax delinquent properties" except for distressed properties,
which would be transferred to new ownership 2 The group began
formulating the plan that would become HPD's Third Party
Transfer Initiative, a policy to alter the process by which the city
45. Alex Schwartz, New York City and Subsidized Housing: Impacts and
Lessons of the City's $5 Billion Capital Budget Housing Plan, 10 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 839, 866-68 (1999).
46. Id. at 866. Included amongst these housing projects were programs
targeting the homeless. Id. at 867.
47. Id. at 867 ("Tenants unable to afford rents that must be increased to
amortize city-subsidized capital improvements were provided Section 8 certificates
or vouchers to prevent their displacement.").
48. Id. at 868.
49. LOCAL INITIATIVE SUPPORT CORPORATION, NEW YORK CITY CASE STUDY
SUMMARY THIRD PARTY TRANSFER INITIATIVE: A SOLUTION TO PROPERTY
ABANDONMENT 2, available at
http://www.lisc.org/resources/assets/asset-upload file414_1064.pdf; see Hirsch &
Wood, supra note 41, at 611.
50. Hirsch & Wood, supra note 41, at 611.




foreclosed on tax delinquent properties. 53
In 1996, at the ten-year mark of Koch's rehabilitation
initiative, New York City adopted Local Law 37, which amended
the New York City administrative code "in relation to tax lien
foreclosure by action in rem."54 The legislation transformed the
property tax foreclosure authority.55 According to Local Law 37,
[w]henever it shall appear that a tax lien or tax liens has or
have been due and unpaid for a period of at least one year from
the date on which the tax, assessment or other legal charge
represented thereby became a lien, such tax lien or tax
liens .... may be summarily foreclosed in the manner provided
in this chapter, notwithstanding the provisions of any general,
special or local law and notwithstanding any omission to hold
a [tax] sale of a tax lien or tax liens prior to such foreclosure. 56
The law allowed HPD to transfer distressed properties, those
in tax arrears and those with various code violations, directly to
new owners.5 7 Unlike New York's previous in rem foreclosure
policy, the city transferred the property, lien-free, to a pre-
qualified third party, avoiding city ownership along with "the cost
of managing the properties and preparing them for sale."58 This
became HPD's Third Party Transfer Initiative, under which, after
the city obtained a final judgment against the property, owners
were granted four months to resolve the tax arrears.59 After the
fourth month, subject to New York City Council review, the city
had the power to convey title to unredeemed properties to
qualified third parties.60
In the context of the Third Party Transfer Initiative, the
Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise
Foundation, non-profit intermediaries operating with both public
and private funds, channeled resources to community development
projects and created Neighborhood Restore, another non-profit
53. Id.
54. N.Y.C., NY, Local Law 37 of 1996, Int. 679-A (May 14, 1996), available at
http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf files/bills/int679a.htm; see David T. Kraut, Hanging
Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight of Vacant Buildings from Urban
Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1156-58 (1999).
55. See Local Law 37 of 1996, supra note 54.
56. See id., § 4.
57. Allred, supra note 19, at 3; see also BRIAN P. KAVANAGH, JONATHAN
SPRINGER & SARAH STEVENSON, UNIVERSITY NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING PROGRAM,
No TITLE: PREVENTING ABANDONMENT WITHOUT CITY OWNERSHIP UNDER NYC
LOCAL LAW 37 OF 1996, available at http://www.unhp.org/prevent.html (examining
attempts to prevent deterioration of housing stock through Local Law 37 of 1996).
58. See Allred, supra note 19, at 3.
59. See Local Law 37 of 1996, supra note 54, § 13; Allred, supra note 19, at 4.
60. See Local Law 37 of 1996, supra note 54, § 13.
2006]
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which assumed interim ownership of the properties.PI
Neighborhood Restore then transferred ownership to for-profit and
non-profit organizations, which included community-based groups
and community development corporations (CDCs) chosen by HPD
through a Request for Qualifications process. 62 New owners and
managers worked with Neighborhood Restore, HPD, and
participating lending institutions to develop the scope of
rehabilitation work for each building and to secure financing.6 3
The passage of Local Rule 37 enabled HPD's Third Party
Transfer Initiative program and the subsequent restructuring of
HPD around the Division of Anti-Abandonment (DAA), which was
charged with reviewing properties and the qualifications of
bidders.6 4 HPD's Office of Development then oversaw the transfer
and rehabilitation of properties.65 To identify new owners, the
61. Allred, supra note 19, at 4; see also William Simon, The Community
Economic Development Movement, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 377, 397 (2002) ("An elaborate
structure of intermediaries has grown up in recent years to support community-
based non-profit housing developers. Some of these institutions are government-
sponsored entities (GSEs), corporations specially chartered by a legislature with
boards wholly or partly publicly-appointed. There is, for example, the Federal
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and, typical of many state examples, the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Corporation. Other such institutions are non-
profits operating across many communities. The Enterprise Foundation and the
Local Initiative Support Corporation are especially notable examples. Such
institutions channel public funds or private charitable donations to provide
financial and technical assistance to community-based developers. Sometimes they
participate as equity partners; sometimes they make loans or grants for specific
projects. They often make loans or grants for general organizational support.
Sometimes they act as financial intermediaries in pooling and/or reselling
securities issued in connection with affordable housing development."). Other
community development intermediaries have also been actively involved in housing
development, including the Housing Partnership Development Corporation and the
Parodneck Foundation. See CAROLINE K. BHALLA ET AL., FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL
ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY'S HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS 2004, at 23, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/realestatecenter
/CREUPPapers/state of-thescity/SOC-intro.html.
62. Allred, supra note 19, at 4. In 2003, LISC committed approximately $15.5
million, and the Enterprise Foundation invested $106 million and participated in
the development and renovation of 1,737 affordable homes. BHALLA ET AL., supra
note 61, at 23; see Interview with Michael Bosnick, HPD Deputy Commissioner,
Anti-Abandonment Division, in New York, NY (Mar. 4, 2004). For a review of the
history of CDCs in housing development, see Paul S. Grogan, Proof Positive: A
Community-Based Solution to America's Affordable Housing Crisis, 7:2 STAN. L. &
POLY REV. 159 (1996).
63. See Interview with Michael Bosnick, supra note 62.
64. Interview by Douglas Jaffe with Jerilyn Perine, former HPD Commissioner,
2000-2004, in New York, NY (May 7, 2004).
65. See THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION &




DAA established a competitive process, including outreach to
CBOs. 66 The DAA targeted communities where the New York City
Police Department had registered high levels of crime and chose
CBOs that were familiar with housing issues.6 7 Each year,
through a competitive bidding process, community groups sought
to manage property and administer housing programs that had
traditionally been administered by government agencies. 68
Through the Third Party Transfer Initiative and accompanying
programs, HPD began developing new relationships with CBOs.
2. Federal Incentive Programs
The city's Third Party Transfer Initiative was complemented
by federal legislative measures, which had been initiated in the
late 1980s and 1990s to support community and private
developers. Specifically, HPD and its intermediaries were
significantly assisted by investment incentives provided by the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program created by
Congress under the auspices of the Internal Revenue Service in
the 1986 Tax Reform Act.69 Through LIHTC, corporate investors
received a federal tax credit in return for providing funds to non-
profit and profit developers to help build or renovate housing for
affordable and low-income rental housing 0  The LIHTC
functioned as a block grant managed at the state level. Each state
66. Allred, supra note 19, at 17; Interview with Michael Bosnick, supra note 62.
67. Interview with Bill Traylor, supra note 41.
68. Interview with Michael Bosnick, supra note 62; Interview with Lydia Tom,
Deputy Director, N.Y. Enterprise Foundation, in New York, NY (Apr. 6, 2004).
69. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 101 Stat. 2189. LIHTC
differed from other federal housing programs in that it was administered by the
IRS and not by HUD, which had been traditionally charged with funding housing
programs for the poor. Megan J. Ballard, Profiting From Poverty: The Competition
Between For-Profit and Non-profit Developers for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits,
55 HASTINGS L. J. 211, 223-24 (2003). For more detail on how LIHTC works, see
Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 489, 511-15 (2000), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd1 102_orlebeke.pdf.
70. As of 1997, the LIHTC tax credit had generated approximately 100,000
housing units annually, or ninety-four percent of all low-income rental apartments
in the United States. PARTNERSHIPS THAT PERFORM: THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDIT, available at
http://www.enterprisefoundation.org/policy/monographs/pubpoll.asp. The initial
idea for creating a tax credit program with specific benefits for non-profit
organizations appeared to have emerged from non-profits involved in providing
affordable housing, which were involved in the legislative process. Both the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation, which, as
discussed, are active housing development intermediaries, during the
Congressional hearings, testified to the benefits of community-managed housing
programs. See Ballard, supra note 69, at 221.
2006]
Law and Inequality
was permitted to allocate a certain amount of tax credits annually
based on its population. Priority was given to projects sponsored
by non-profits, including community-based organizations, and
state housing agencies were required to designate at least ten
percent of the LIHTC credits to projects sponsored by non-profit
developers. 71
Other federal initiatives followed. The Housing Act of 1990
created the HOME program in 1992, which made housing block
grants directly available to city agencies like HPD.72 HOME
provided federal funds for housing development to both renters
and lower income owners but transferred selection power from
federal bureaucrats to local officials.7 3 HOME mandated that
fifteen percent of allocations within each jurisdiction must be
designated to "Community Housing Development
Organizations."'74  These non-profit development organizations
were defined as organizations engaged in affordable housing
development that practiced accountability "through significant
representation on [their] organization's governing board[s] and
otherwise, accountability to low-income community residents and,
to the extent practicable, low-income beneficiaries" of its
activities.75 HOME funds could be used for a variety of purposes
including providing operating support for non-profit
organizations. 76
Other federal housing programs also designated non-profits
as preferred purchasers and developers. In 1990, for example,
HUD created a program targeting privately owned housing and
designated non-profits as "priority purchasers. ' 77 Further, under a
1992 provision to the Housing Act of 1990, residents' councils
could apply to HUD to have management of property transferred
from local housing agencies under the condition that any new
managers had to be non-profits or joint ventures with non-profit
input.78
In New York City, HPD partnered with intermediaries like
71. 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5) (2000). Non-profit sponsorship meant that a non-profit
organization had an interest in the development and "materially participate[d]" in
the development and operation of the property. Id.; Ballard, supra note 69, at 224.
72. See Orlebeke, supra note 69, at 491.
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12771(a) (2000); Simon, supra note 61, at 396.
75. Simon, supra note 61, at 396.
76. Id.
77. 12 U.S.C. § 4110(b) (2000); Simon, supra note 61, at 396.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1437w(c), (f) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1437m (2000); Simon, supra
note 61, at 396.
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Neighborhood Restore and used the federal funding and incentive
programs to assist CBOs in becoming property developers and
managers.7 9  Strict federal compliance requirements, which
included deadlines for completion of rehabilitation and financing
and specific requests on property conditions, forced HPD, the
intermediaries, and CBOs to coordinate and collaborate in ways
they had not done so in the past.80
3. Developing Local Partnerships
HPD supplemented the federal and local legislative
initiatives with a new systemic approach to dealing with property
abandonment which directly depended on local community
information. HPD's goal was to target buildings that were headed
for abandonment and intervene at the source of the problem by
assembling detailed, street-level information, in an effort to curtail
the "end of the pipe" regulatory practices of the past.8 ' HPD began
the process by identifying early warning indicators and adopted an
information-driven system which evaluated the level of tax
arrears, lien-to-market value ratio, and the extent of delinquency
with respect to housing code violations.8 2 HPD created borough
field offices in the five New York City boroughs (Bronx,
Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island, and Queens) to monitor
properties, coordinate the information gathering efforts, and
intervene when necessary. Indeed, this was not the first time
HPD created neighborhood planning offices. In the 1980s, HPD
created neighborhood offices which were merged and later
abandoned in the 1990s during the mayoral tenure of Rudolph
Guliani.83 In contrast to the planning offices of the past, HPD's
new borough field offices highlighted prevention and data
gathering. CBOs, in collaboration with the HPD field offices,
served to triage properties in the preventive process,8 4 and
communicated to tenants and owners HPD's changing system8 5
79. LOCAL INITIATIVE SUPPORT CORPORATION, supra note 49, at 2.
80. Interview with Lydia Tom, supra note 68.
81. Interview with Michael Bosnick, supra note 62; Interview with Jerilyn
Perine, supra note 64. The term "end of the pipe" is often used in the context of
describing conventional environmental regulation. See, e.g., Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 293 (2001).
82. See Allred, supra note 51, at 17.
83. Telephone Interview with Mary Dailey, former Executive Director,
Northwest Bronx, in New York, NY (Aug. 2, 2005). Mary Dailey resigned as
Executive Director in May 2005. James Mumm is the current Executive Director.




One way CBOs began to take on this new role was through
DAA's neighborhood preservation consultant program 8 6 Although
there had been neighborhood-based contracts with community
groups in the past, during the Guliani tenure, the preservation
consultant programs focused more on gathering information on
distressed properties in order to feed the Third Party Transfer and
tax lien mechanisms.8 7 Arguably, this shift was part of HPD's
agenda to assist problem landlords.5 8 DAA contracted CBOs to
serve as neighborhood preservation consultants for each of the
field offices. 89 DAA, in conjunction with Neighborhood Restore and
other intermediary non-profits, appraised the community group's
possibility of receiving a contract by evaluating whether the group
could comply with the program's fixed deliverables: conducting
building surveys, referring owners for loan applications,
recommending owners for voluntary repair agreements,
conducting workshops for tenants and landlords, organizing
mailings discussing HPD and neighborhood preservation
consultant services, and intervening to resolve problems with and
between tenants and landlords.90 The neighborhood preservation
consultants were HPD's street-level monitors and administrators.
Among other things, the consultants evaluated and surveyed the
conditions of particular properties and then met with HPD's field
officers, who determined the next steps.9 1  With the pooled
information gathered by the neighborhood preservation
consultants, the DAA had a more comprehensive view of local
variations and property trends and was able to more directly track
conditions and control against abandonment.92  Through this
86. According to the former HPD commissioner, the idea was to make DAA the
hub for preservation activities within HPD, including the information gathering
efforts by the grassroots organizations. See Interview with Jerilyn Perine, supra
note 64. The DAA also gathered information about which properties were at risk
from sources such as code violations, calls to the customer service center, and
Department of Finance records. See id.; Interview with Bill Traylor, supra note 41.
87. Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 83. According to Mary Dailey,
ironically the old neighborhood-based contracts often were more supportive of
tenant organizing. Id.
88. Id.
89. Interview with Michael Bosnick, supra note 62.
90. Id. "Definitions of the Eight Neighborhood Preservation Consultants
Program Deliverables," from Michael Boswick, HPD Deputy Commissioner, Anti-
Abandonment Division to author (July 25, 2001) (on file with author); see Appendix
2.
91. Interview with Michael Bosnick, supra note 62.
92. Id. For a review of how information pooling is used in the context of
environmental regulation, see Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke & Bradley
Karkkainen, Beyond Backward Environmentalism, BOSTON REV. (Oct. 1999),
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progress, CBOs, for their part, developed their own expertise on
housing standards and became part of the city-wide prevention
efforts.
Informed and sustained by community involvement, New
York City's property rehabilitation, anti-abandonment, and third-
party transfer initiatives had significant results. By the late
1990s, the city no longer had the landlord status that had at one
point defined it. HPD's transformation, however, was incomplete.
Compelling landlords to remedy violations of the housing code
remained a problem and community-based groups like Northwest
Bronx continued to demand HPD's reform.9 3
II. Northwest Bronx and the Evolution of an Adversarial
Methodology
A. Northwest Bronx's Origins and Initial Targets
1. The Alinsky Origins
Although Paul Brant, one of Northwest Bronx's founders,
described the organization as "the largest sustained Alinsky-style
organizing effort in the United States,"94 Northwest Bronx had
modest beginnings.95 In 1974, Northwest Bronx residents began
responding to the crisis that was advancing toward them from the
South Bronx, where approximately ten blocks a year fell to
abandonment and arson.9 6  That year, local parishes in the
Northwest Bronx organized a three-day conference on "Strategies
for Ministry in the Urban Struggle."97 Out of the three-day
conference, the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition
available at http://www.bostonreview.netIBR24.5/sabel.html.
93. One of the critiques was that HPD lacked effective tools to compel landlords
to remedy violations where the building did not have long-term tax delinquency
and was therefore not eligible for a third party transfer. Comments by Jim Buckley
from the Meeting of Northwest Bronx, UNHP, and FBHC Leadership (May 20,
2004) [hereinafter May 20 Meeting]. To housing organizers like Northwest Bronx,
it often appeared that HPD was too willing to commit resources to assisting
borderline landlords rather than to pursuing litigation for housing code violations.
Id.
94. JONNES, supra note 3, at 375.
95. Margaret Groarke, Organizing Against Overfinancing: The Northwest
Bronx Campaign Against Freddie Mac, (Dec. 2002) § 2, available at
http://comm.org.utoledo.edu/papers2003/groarke.htm; see JONNES, supra note 3, at
349.
96. See David Gonzalez, Bronx Community Groups Find Strength in Unity,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994.
97. Groarke, supra note 95, §2, 2; see JONNES supra note 3, at 349.
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was created. 98 The new organization was maintained by church
collections and a $15,000 contribution by Dollar Savings Bank. 9
The seed money was used to hire six organizers to help form
tenant associations. 00 Northwest Bronx's mission was to organize
residents to demand better services from landlords, city agencies,
and mortgage lenders. 0 1
Northwest Bronx was founded as a Saul Alinsky
organization. Some of its first organizers had been trained in the
Alinsky school and brought with them the methodology of the
Alinsky organizations of the day.102 Alinsky-defined organizations
used political pragmatism and aggressive realpolitik in dealing
with government power and stressed the importance of organizing
around the self-interest of specific geographic communities. 03
Alinskyism was recognized for its adversarial, zero-sum approach
to community organizing. 04 Direct action and "hits" were a
signature of Ainsky organizations. 105  Although Alinsky's
activities were often based in communities of color, race, gender,
and ethnicity politics were seen as a distraction from the issue-
based organizing 0 6
Indeed, Saul Ainsky is widely acknowledged as the father of
98. See Groarke, supra note 95, §2, 2; JONNES, supra note 3, at 349.
99. JONNES, supra note 3, at 348.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Id.
103. Osterman, supra note 11, at 262, 267; see SAUL ALINSKY, RULES FOR
RADICALS: A PRAGMATIC PRIMER FOR REALISTIC RADICALS 53 (1971). Saul Alinsky's
texts were charged with self-interest analysis:
From the great teachers of Judeo-Christian morality and the
philosophers, to the economists, and to the wise observers of the politics
of man, there has always been universal agreement on the part that
self-interest plays as a prime moving force in man's behavior. The
importance of self-interest has never been challenged; it has been
accepted as an inevitable fact of life.
Id.; see RICHARD WOOD, FAITH IN ACTION: RELIGION, RACE AND DEMOCRATIC
ORGANIZING IN AMERICA, 174-75 (2002).
104. RINKU SEN, STIR IT UP: LESSONS IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZING AND
ADVOCACY xliv-xlix (2003).
105. A direct action, for example, consisted of dozens of busloads of people
appearing at an elected official's or a bureaucrat's office with a bullhorn and a
demand for the target to meet with the organization. See Groarke, supra note 95,
§6, 9. A hit is a surprise visit to a target, usually one who has ignored the
organization's requests for a meeting, or failed to keep commitments. Id
106. See WOOD, supra note 103, at 104; SEN, supra note 104, at xviii; Susan Stall
& Randy Stoecker, Community Organizing or Organizing Community? Gender and
the Crafts of Empowerment, 7-8, available at http://comm-
org.utoledo.edu/papers97/; Francis Calpotura, The View front the Ground:
Organizers Speak Out on Race, COLOR LINES, 17-18 (Summer 2000).
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contemporary community-based organizing because he was the
first to devise and document a model of organizing that could be
replicated. 107 Saul Alinsky chronicled his organizing theories in
two important books, Rules for Radicals, published in 1971, and
Reveille for Radicals, published in 1946.108 In Rules for Radicals,
Alinsky began with the following introduction:
What follows is for those who want to change the world from
what it is to what they believe it should be. The Prince was
written by Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power.
Rules for Radicals is written for the Have-Nots on how to take
it away. 109
The concept of "organizing" that Saul Ainsky propounded
was based on three general principles: win real, immediate, and
concrete improvement in people's lives; give people a sense of their
own power; and alter the relations of power. 1 0
Alinsky founded in the 1940s the oldest existing organizing
network, the Industrial Areas Foundation. Other national
networks emerged based on varying forms of the Alinsky model,
including the Community Service Organization (CSO) in Los
Angeles founded in 1949, the Association of Community-based
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) in the Midwest founded
in 1970, the People's Institute for Community Organizing (PICO)
in Oakland, the National People's Action (NPA) in Chicago
founded in 1972, and the Midwest Academy and the Citizen Action
Network in Chicago founded in 1979.111
Like other Ainsky organizations, Northwest Bronx began as
an organization with a broad-based agenda focused on
redistributing power, developing local leadership, and criticizing
public actors. Northwest Bronx's initial campaigns targeted and
reacted to the neighborhoods' immediate problems. Where crime
was a major concern, Northwest Bronx organized block patrols and
107. See SEN, supra note 104, at xliv.
108. See id.
109. ALINSKY, supra note 103, at 3.
110. KIM BOBO, JACKIE KENDALL & STEVE MAX, ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE: MIDWEST ACADEMY MANUAL FOR ACTIVISTS 11-12 (2001); see Scott L.
Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48
UCLA L. REV. 443, 461 (2001). Of course, although Saul Alinsky is often associated
with modern organizing, there were earlier incarnations of the practice, with
certain scholars tracing its origins to the 1880s. See Robert Fisher, Neighborhood
Organizing: The Importance of Historical Context (1995), available at http://comm-
org.utoledo.edu/papers96/fishercon.htm.
111. See SEN, supra note 104, at xlvi; National People's Action, http://www.npa-
us.org/whats.html. The National People's Action helped develop the Northwest
Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition in the 1970s. See MEDIRATTA, supra note 6,
at 9, Table 2.
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meetings with police. 112 Where housing services was the main
problem, Northwest Bronx petitioned for building inspections and
organized rent strikes' 13
Northwest Bronx was particularly critical of the city's lack of
interest in developing and preserving housing in the northwest
Bronx area. Northwest Bronx's relationship with the city's
Housing Development Administration, which in 1976 became
HPD, was contentious from the start. Northwest Bronx's Housing
Committee targeted the Housing Development Administration
with almost daily visits to its headquarters with little success.1 4
At an event at Fordham University in the Bronx in 1975,
organizers confronted Housing Development Administration
Commissioner Roger Starr for refusing to meet with them.115
When federal funding was denied to the area in 1976, the Bronx's
worst year for conflagration, Northwest Bronx's leadership wrote
an open letter to Commissioner Starr: "[w]hat contempt City
government exhibits towards neighborhoods and committees such
as ours! In our view this is only the most recent in a series of
evasions, deceptions, broken promises and buck-passing .... I 6
2. Northwest Bronx's Winning Campaigns and New
Pragmatism
The Reagan years were marked by dramatic reductions in
governmental programs, 117 and Northwest Bronx responded by
demanding private sector investment."l 8 Northwest Bronx was at
the forefront of New York community groups using the
Community Reinvestment Act (Reinvestment Act) to pressure
banks to invest more in the Bronx." 9 Enacted by Congress in
1977, the Reinvestment Act ascribes to any bank that receives
federal deposit insurance a "continuing and affirmative obligation
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which [it
112. JONNES, supra note 3, at 350.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 354.
115. Id. at 354-55.
116. Id. at 355, 363. The Bronx registered 35,380 property fires in 1976. See
Michelle O'Donnell, Neighborhood Report: Melrose - What Began in Fire, Ends in
Ice, N.Y. TIMES, section 14, Feb. 9, 2003 (discussing the decline of Bronx fires:
35,380 in 1976; 21,339 in 1988; 16,428 in 1995; and 10,810 in 2002).
117. See JONNES, supra note 3, at 371; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 285-89 (1986); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF
WELFARE REFORM 61-62 (1995) (describing federal government cuts to social
service programs during the Reagan administration).
118. See JONNES, supra note 3, at 371.
119. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000); see JONNES, supra note 3, at 369.
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is] chartered." 120 The obligation applies to the "entire community,
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent
with the safe and sound operation of such institutions."121
Northwest Bronx supplemented its knowledge and usage of the
Reinvestment Act with adversarial tactics that included organized
direct actions against the board of directors of banks and
corporations. 122 Northwest Bronx's strategies had results, and it
soon was able to attract federal community development funds.
Northwest Bronx's geographic area was designated a
"Neighborhood Strategy Area" with millions pouring into major
projects such as subway and park renovations.123 Soon, the federal
incentive programs allowed Northwest Bronx to spin-off
community development corporations (CDCs) to manage and
finance housing. 124 Each CDC was an independent, non-profit
corporation with its own Board of Directors and staff.125
Northwest Bronx, through these federal incentive programs,
became involved, albeit indirectly, in property development and
management. 26
By the late 1970s Northwest Bronx had become involved in
city-wide organizing campaigns including participating in anti-
arson and anti-redlining coalitions. 27  During the 1980s
Northwest Bronx participated in three significant campaigns,
including Project Reclaim, which was aimed at rehabilitating
vacant buildings and keeping rents affordable for Northwest
Bronx families. 128 Through this campaign, Northwest Bronx took
on both the city and private lenders. Northwest Bronx also
launched ONTOP, a city-wide campaign to increase non-profit
ownership, repairs, and rehabilitation at affordable rents. 29
Finally, Northwest Bronx organized its neighborhood associations
in a city-wide campaign against Major Capital Improvement rent
120. § 2901(a)(1).
121. §§ 2901(a)(3), 2903(a)(1).
122. See JONNES, supra note 3, at 371. For example, in 1983, after a direct
action at a Chase Board of Directors meeting, the Chase Chairman decided to
cooperate with Northwest Bronx and, through HPD, made available millions in
loans to weatherize properties. Id.
123. Id. at 369-70.
124. Id. at 370.
125. See MEDIRATrA, supra note 6, at 9, Table 2.
126. See JONNES, supra note 3, at 370. Members of Northwest Bronx's senior
staff became directors of the new CD Cs. Id.
127. Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 83.
128. See Groarke, supra note 95, § 2, 5; Interview with Mary Dailey, supra
note 83.




Through the Major Capital Improvement Campaign,
Northwest Bronx became aware of suspect financing that involved
increases in system replacements matched by declines in regular
building maintenance.' 3' This was soon linked to the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's (Freddie Mac) lending
practices. 132 By conducting title searches, organizers began to
notice a pattern of inflated Freddie Mac mortgages. 133 Mary
Dailey, then organizer for the Mosholu Woodlawn South
Community Coalition, one of the member neighborhood
associations of Northwest Bronx, found that almost every building
she researched had a large Freddie Mac mortgage. 34 Northwest
Bronx's investigation revealed, for example, that, as of 1989,
Freddie Mac controlled $663 million in multi-family mortgages in
more than 700 buildings in the area. 35
Northwest Bronx scheduled a workshop on overfinancing
that explained to tenants the links between a lender's
overfinancing, shortage of adequate services, and property
abandonment and arson. 136 The connection between the large
mortgages, declining services, and increasing rents became
obvious to tenants and organizers. 137 Landlords were spending a
large percentage of their rental income on repaying mortgages and
had fewer funds available to maintain properties and service
tenants. 13 8 A real estate boom in the mid-1980s inflated property
values throughout New York City.139 When property values began
to decline, landlords found themselves without the sufficient
capital to cover debts, a problem that could lead to a repeat of the
property abandonment crisis of the 1970s.140
130. See Groarke, supra note 95, § 2, 1 5. Rent increases are granted to
landlords who make building-wide capital improvements such as new windows or
new boilers. Id.
131. Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 83.
132. Id.; see Groarke, supra note 95, § 3; Freddie Mac,
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/who-we-are/regulation.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2006). The Federal Government established Freddie Mac to buy
mortgages and repackage them as securities, thus freeing the assets of the banks
and mortgage companies to make new mortgages. Id.










Northwest Bronx's campaign against Freddie Mac had the
Alinsky brand: organizers distributed flyers which equated
Freddie Mac to Freddie Krueger, 14' members went to Freddie
Mac's offices in Virginia and demanded a meeting with the
CEO, 142 and, using the proxies of a religious order that held shares
in Freddie Mac, members attended Freddie Mac's stockholders'
meeting and demanded that Freddie Mac sell its foreclosed
properties to responsible owners. 143
Throughout this campaign, Northwest Bronx educated
tenants about housing standards and the mortgage market.144
Tenants learned about the secondary mortgage market and the
incentives for seller, servicers, and property owners to overvalue
their properties to Freddie Mac.145 Freddie Mac bought mortgages
from financial institutions who lent directly to borrowers. 46 These
institutions not only sold the mortgages to Freddie Mac for fees
but also tended to service the mortgages after the purchase. 47
Freddie Mac relied on appraisal information submitted by the
seller/servicer institutions and did not conduct its own
independent inquiry as to the financial and physical conditions of
the properties. 148  The result was that the seller/servicer
information was often inaccurate and incomplete because the
seller/servicers earned fees based on the number and size of the
mortgages, as well as the servicing.149
Northwest Bronx's housing agenda took shape out of
concerns that were raised when a new group of tenants was
introduced to the Freddie Mac problem:
If Freddie Mac gave my landlord so much money, shouldn't
some of the money be spent on the building? If they have
money invested here, don't they care that the building is
deteriorating? What will happen if the landlord abandons the
building, or Freddie Mac forecloses? Since the federal
government sponsors Freddie Mac, shouldn't they have a
special responsibility to ensure that the buildings they finance
141. See id. § 4, 2.
142. See id. § 6, 8.
143. Id. § 8, 3.
144. See id. § 4, 2.
145. Id.
146. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION: ABUSES IN MULTIFAMILY PROGRAM INCREASE EXPOSURE TO
FINANCIAL Loss 3 (1991), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2bat7/145014.pdf.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 2.
149. See id. at 4-8.
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provide decent, affordable housing? 150
Through Northwest Bronx's campaign, tenants learned about
mortgage enforcement and the implications of a mortgage's "good
repair clause."'151 Tenants went on to use the clause to demand
inspections, repairs, and foreclosures from owners, the
government, and lenders. 152
In its efforts to reform Freddie Mac's lending practices,
Northwest Bronx led a multi-pronged campaign which targeted
everyone from Freddie Mac board members to city and federal
representatives. 53 The campaign had results. In September
1990, New York congressional representatives requested an audit
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) of Freddie Mac's lending
practices. 54 GAO reviewed thirty-five properties in the Bronx
that Northwest Bronx had identified as overfinanced.
155
Addressed to United States Senators and Representatives from
New York, the GAO Report read:
You expressed concern about Freddie Mac's mortgages for
[thirty-five] Bronx properties, which a community group had
charged were overfinanced and were allowed to deteriorate.
As agreed, for the [thirty-five] properties, we examined
whether Freddie Mac accepted overvalued appraisals when it
purchased the mortgages, which resulted in overfinancing (for
purposes of this report, we defined overfinancing as a
mortgage purchase that exposed Freddie Mac to more risk of
loss than it had knowingly accepted); had in effect a loan
servicing process in the years after the mortgage purchase
that protected it against additional risk; and has new
procedures to address the problems that resulted in
overfinancing and servicing problems. 156
GAO examined the financing of the thirty-five properties,
and, in 1991, released a report titled "Abuses in Multifamily
Program Increase Exposure to Financial Losses," criticizing
Freddie Mac's lending practices and requesting a formal
investigation by the United States Attorney. 57 Prompted by
Northwest Bronx organizers, the GAO investigation forced Freddie
Mac to change its practices nationwide. 158 The GAO Report
150. Groarke, supra note 95, § 4, 2.
151. See id. 2-3.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 5, 1.
154. Id. § 7, 1.
155. Id.; U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 146, at 1.
156. U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 146, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 2.




Because of weak controls, Freddie Mac did not detect patterns
of inaccurate and incomplete information in the appraisals
and reports on the physical and financial condition of the
properties that were provided by seller/servicers. As a result,
Freddie Mac overfinanced [twenty-seven] of the [thirty-five]
properties by about [twenty] percent of its total investment in
them, or $5.4 million, and increased opportunities for fraud
and program abuse to occur. In this regard, we have referred
certain matters discussed in this report to the [United States]
Attorney for appropriate action. . . . The internal control
weaknesses we identified have also been found in other
reviews of Freddie Mac's multifamily program nationwide. In
response to these weaknesses as well as to its financial losses,
Freddie Mac suspended purchases in its major multifamily
program in September 1990. It is currently developing new
procedures for the multi-family program and will resume
purchases when it determines that these procedures are
adequate to prevent problems in the future. . . . [U]nless
Freddie Mac develops additional controls to ensure that it
makes decisions on the basis of accurate and complete
information, it will continue to be exposed to program abuse
and avoidable financial losses. 159
Northwest Bronx's campaign and subsequent action by
Congress and the GAO forced Freddie Mac to become more
selective about financing. Freddie Mac altered its underwriting
criteria, lowering the loan to value ratio, and instituted more
stringent certifications and reporting requirements. 60 In 1990,
also in response, Freddie Mac established a comprehensive
Mortgage Fraud division.16 1  The numerous foreclosures that
resulted from Freddie Mac's change in enforcement led to a new
campaign, whereby community groups negotiated with Freddie
Mac to sell foreclosed properties directly to tenants, CDCs or, at a
minimum, reputable landlords.162  In response to Northwest
Bronx's ongoing pressure and direct actions, in 1992 Freddie Mac
created its own "exclusionary list" of problem landlords. 163 The
success of the campaign required an understanding of complex
housing issues: how a distant government-financed entity, Freddie
Mac, affected the quality and affordability of apartments in the
Bronx. The Freddie Mac campaign provided new strategic and
leadership-building tools to Northwest Bronx and served as a
159. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 146, at 10-11.
160. Id.
161. Groarke, supra note 95, § 9, 3; Kenneth Howe, Home-Loan Fraud Hits the
Big Time, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 1992, at B1.
162. See Groarke, supra note 95, § 6.
163. Id. § 6, 5.
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model for future engagement with government agencies like HPD.
B. Northwest Bronx Redefines Organizing164
Mary Dailey, Northwest Bronx's former Executive Director,
highlighted the lessons learned from the various campaigns. 165
According to Dailey, effective community organizing is measured
by evaluating the grassroots leaders' expertise on the policy
applications of those issues that first attracted them to a given
group. 166 With this framework, Northwest Bronx has developed
tenant leaders to address complex real estate issues.167 According
to Dailey, organizing becomes a "process that distills issues from a
broader problem and identifies decision makers who have
influence or control over policies that can be changed to improve or
reverse aspects of the broader problem."'168 Indeed,
while only a small percentage of the tenants that an
organization like Northwest Bronx interacts with will develop
this level of expertise, the organization's ability to win is
anchored in its ability to demonstrate that real people with
real problems can name solutions. Therefore, the organizing
process is dependent upon constantly searching for new
members who have both the inclination and potential to
become respected and knowledgeable leaders. 169
Northwest Bronx's evolution in its organizing practices
paralleled changes in its internal politics and organization. For
most of the 1970s and 1980s, Northwest Bronx's governance
structure resembled that of a corporation with a centralized Board
of Directors and executive committee. 70  Northwest Bronx's
governance body consisted of ten neighborhood associations and
six clergy seats. 71 The most important level of identification was
the neighborhood association's relationship to Northwest Bronx.172
Each neighborhood association operated largely independently
from the others and from Northwest Bronx's Board of Directors
and Executive Director. 173 Each neighborhood association sent one
164. The facts in this Section are from various interviews with Mary Dailey.
165. Mary Dailey, hand-out, Lessons from Northwest Bronx Freddie Mac
Campaign for Today, Oct. 14, 2003.
166. Id.; Telephone Interview with Mary Dailey, former Executive Director,
Northwest Bronx, in New York, NY (July 22, 2005).









representative to the Board.174 The association representative
operated within a traditional framework, serving as liaison
between the Board and the neighborhood association. 175 The
neighborhood association carried on most of its business without
regard to the larger platform or agenda of Northwest Bronx as a
coalition. 176 Although designed to be committees of the Board of
Directors, the issue committees of Northwest Bronx functioned as
independent committees and operated in whatever way the more
powerful neighborhood associations and congregations saw fit,
with some neighborhood associations contributing to many issue
committees and others contributing to few or none.177
The organization was competitive internally and there were
often tensions between representatives of the neighborhood
associations on the Northwest Bronx Board and the neighborhood
association presidents. 178 These two parties saw their roles as
opposed to one another. 179 Issue campaigns operated largely by
putting neighborhood associations in tandem rather than through
a collective planning process. 8 0 Staff organizers identified the
issues and created temporary committees to deal with problems as
they emerged. 81 The representative looked to maximize and buy
into the broader Northwest Bronx agenda and activities, while the
neighborhood association president looked to maximize the
amount of resources that could be drawn from Northwest Bronx
into individual neighborhoods. 18 2 The Northwest Bronx Board, on
the other hand, was left to deal with organizational problems,
including conflicts between the staff, leadership, and
membership. 8 3
In contrast, the Northwest Bronx of today is a closely-knit
federation of ten neighborhood associations, over twenty local
congregations, and a youth affiliate, Sistas & Brothas United












185. Interview with James Mumm, current Executive Director of Northwest
Bronx, in New York, NY (June 30, 2005).
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Northwest Bronx serves a population of approximately 400,000
with half of that population being immigrants.5 6 In New York,
Northwest Bronx is second to ACORN in community organizing
scale and is one of the largest neighborhood-based community
organizing groups in the country, with an organizing budget of
over one million dollars. 8 7  Although Northwest Bronx has
expanded its reach and now addresses education, land use, and
immigration reform issues, housing organizing continues to be its
focus. 188 As in the past, Northwest Bronx's mission in housing
organizing is to target a group of major problem owners and to
seek reforms in both industry standards and HPD's code
enforcement and intervention practices.
In the 1990s, the organization also began to reconsider its
focus on leadership.5 9 In 1995, during a strategic planning
session, the Board of Directors decided to take affirmative steps to
make decision-making more transparent and integrate more
members into the decision-making process. 90 In the late 1990s,
the Board and senior staff created a core leadership team to guide
the organization, bringing in both the representatives and
presidents of the neighborhood associations, as well as other
leaders from outside the traditional hierarchy of the affiliated
associations and groups.1 91 The executive director and staff
recommend individual members to the core leadership team. 92
Further, Northwest Bronx holds strategic planning meetings three
to eight times a year, and during the sessions the executive
director seeks recommendations from the staff.193 Currently, the
core leadership team consists of about thirty members.194 The
elastic nature of the core leadership team has allowed for greater
buy in and more solidarity between neighborhoods and individual
leaders, and across issue areas. 195 The principle behind the core
leadership team matched Northwest Bronx's evolving philosophy
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Interview with Rinku Sen, Publisher, Color Lines/Applied Research Ctr., in
New York, NY (Sept. 3, 2003). The Bronx remains the borough with the lowest
ownership rate in New York City. BHALLA, ET AL., supra note 93, at 11, Table 11-2.










of increasing and diversifying responsibilities, as well as
developing new leadership. 96 Northwest Bronx's message-"The
Coalition is the neighborhoods - the neighborhoods are the
Coalition"-was easier for members to experience and exercise
through the open structures that allowed for cross-neighborhood
training and problem-solving.197 The core leadership team
evaluated the organization as a whole and looked at issues of
participation and representation. 198  The organization created
problem-oriented committees to deal with both the external and
internal dynamics of the organization. 199 When needed, task
forces from the core leadership team, not just members of the
Board, defined and solved organizational problems, allowing for a
greater balance of interests and skills and for diverse
combinations of experiences and politics. 200
One internal issue that the leadership team has had to
address is the adequacy of representation across racial and ethnic
lines within the leadership of the organization.201 Despite the fact
that the vast majority of the membership base is Black and Latino,
Northwest Bronx has struggled to integrate people of color into its
leadership and senior staff. In 2004, the core leadership team
recommended that the neighborhood associations that comprise
Northwest Bronx change their governing bylaws to incorporate a
representation clause where each affiliate's Board of Directors had
to reflect the diversity of the neighborhood it served.2 02 The
bylaws set forth that "[iun electing the Board of Directors the
general membership will strive to nominate members who
represent the diversity of the broader community."2 03 In post-
Alinsky character, the recommended bylaws mandated a mission
statement for the neighborhood associations which affirmatively
integrated racial justice: "We choose to address issues that we





200. Telephone Interview with Mary Dailey, former Executive Director of
Northwest Bronx, in New York, NY (Aug. 3, 2005).
201. Northwest Bronx is not unlike other Alinsky organizations. Although the
membership base has often been made up of people of color, Alinsky organizations
historically have been led by White staff and White leaders. See SEN, supra note
104, at xlix.
202. Interview with James Mumm, supra note 185.
203. Template for Revisions of Neighborhood Association, Sample By-Laws at 4
[hereinafter Sample By-Laws] (on file with author).
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for our families, our communities, and ourselves.'20 4 The bylaws
also incorporated language about guaranteeing translation
services when needed in an attempt to address the needs of
immigrants. 205
Under Northwest Bronx's present structure, hierarchy and
strict lines of accountability are less well defined but actual
accountability is stronger. Under this system, Northwest Bronx
consists of a greater web of relationships, holding a coalition
together and sharing a common vision for building it. Northwest
Bronx's center incorporates the leadership team, staff, and Board
which, much like HPD's DAA, has become the hub of information
pooling and dissemination. Northwest Bronx's core leadership
team guides the organization and develops procedures for holding
the staff and members accountable when issues of hierarchy and
representation need to be addressed.20 6  The neighborhood
associations and congregations that report to and sustain the
center are linked by issues and interests, not solely by
geography.207  While each affiliate does not have the same
structure, some are neighborhood associations and others are
congregations, each organization is accountable to the others
through the constant focus on information sharing via the core and
the dynamic nature of the issues that concern and affect the
membership.208
Northwest Bronx's capacity to learn and adapt to both
internal and external realties has allowed it to evolve into a
grassroots organization that, in post-Alinsky character, integrates
a pragmatic ideology into its organizing practices and collaborates
and innovates with government in public problem-solving while
developing independent systems of accountability to deal with its
internal and external realities. However, similar to its target,
HPD, Northwest Bronx's transformation is not yet complete.
Although Northwest Bronx's internal changes have allowed it to
become a more pragmatic and democratic organization, questions
persist concerning the adequacy of representation and the
distribution of skill and training to the general membership.2 ° 9
While members of the staff and leadership have become
204. Id. at 1. Arguably, such direct attempts at addressing the adequacy of
racial and ethnic representation would never have been imagined by Saul Alinsky.
205. See id. at 2.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.; Northwest Bronx Organizational chart (on file with author).
209. Interview with James Mumm, supra note 185.
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sophisticated organizers and negotiators, the general membership
remains to be fully integrated into and informed of the
organization's new practices and evolving relationships with
targets and partners. Ironically, Northwest Bronx's evolving
relationship with HPD might force it to more fully and materially
involve its base in various complex levels of problem-solving.
III. Northwest Bronx's and HPD's Deliberative Practices
and Possibilities
A. Northwest Bronx and HPD at the Cross-Roads
HPD's and Northwest Bronx's dealings are complex and
ongoing. Throughout their co-evolution there have been moments
of contention as well as agreement. Over the years, HPD's and
Northwest Bronx's breaks from past practices have allowed for
new forms of collaboration and problem-solving. HPD's
restructuring around DAA, the creation of the Third Party
Transfer Initiative and the neighborhood preservation consultant
program, in combination with federal incentive programs, have all
played out at the grassroots level. In order to fulfill HPD's charge
with regard to tax lien sales and Third Party Transfers, for
example, DAA created systems for data collection which explicitly
relied on CBOs. 210 Local government learned that it needed local
knowledge to exercise its new roles. Throughout this process,
Northwest Bronx has been undergoing its own transformation.
HPD's hesitant openness to Northwest Bronx's feedback and ideas
has allowed Northwest Bronx to build stronger and more
motivated tenant leaders as the leaders get to witness more
results for their efforts. 211 The result is a new form of engagement
which integrates more deliberative practices, generates norms
which are informed by both government and interested and
motivated stakeholders, and produces a more comprehensive
understanding of the factors behind public problems.
The CDCs are examples of government-led community
development programs that facilitated greater interaction and
incentivized a new form of engagement between government and
community groups. In the 1980s, members of the Northwest
Bronx used federal funds to create independent CDCs to build and
maintain affordable housing in the Northwest Bronx.2 12 These
210. Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 83.
211. Id.
212. Randy Stoecker, Community Development and Community Organizing:
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CDCs have financed, acquired, rehabilitated, and managed
distressed properties that would otherwise have languished in the
city's in rem stock.213 The most active of these Northwest Bronx
CDCs are Fordham Bedford Housing Corporation, Mount Hope
Housing Company, and the University Neighborhood Housing
Program.2 14 Fordham Bedford Housing Corporation and Mount
Hope Housing Company, for example, have become close allies of
the Enterprise Foundation, the non-profit intermediary. In 2002,
the Enterprise Foundation worked with these two CDCs to
rehabilitate nine buildings (a total of sixteen apartments) through
a Neighborhood Homes Program.215 By providing a loan against
the proceeds from the eventual sale of the house, the Enterprise
Foundation helped Northwest Bronx and its affiliated CDCs meet
their pre-development and construction costs. 21 6 Intermediaries
like the Enterprise Foundation have provided Northwest Bronx's
affiliated but independent CDCs with the technical assistance and
management training to maintain property and comply with local
and federal compliance requirements.217  Intermediaries also
assisted Northwest Bronx with restructuring CDCs as limited
liability corporations, formed to hold property, with the CBO
Apple and Oranges? Chicken and Egg?, in FROM ACT UP TO THE WTO: URBAN
PROTEST AND COMMUNITY BUILDING IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 387 (Benjamin
Shepard & Ronald Hayduk eds., 2002). The developments in national housing
policy, particularly the turn toward public-private partnerships, helped fuel the
CDCs throughout the 1980s and 1990s. See JONNES, supra note 3, at 389-97. As
money became available through legislative incentives such as the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit program, foundations and non-profits with government
sponsorships sprung up around the country to channel private funding and
technical assistance to community-based housing organizations, like the CDCs
created by Northwest Bronx. Id. at 397.
213. Northwest Bronx's creation of distinct entities to hold and manage housing
stock is similar to the arrangement by the Industrial Areas Foundations (IAF) of
Project Quest, a job training program in San Antonio, Texas. As discussed by Paul
Osterman:
The IAF does not want to be in the service-providing business and
QUEST was organized as a distinct entity with its own staff. The
board of QUEST comes from the IAF organizations, as well as members
of the local business community, and the LAF organizations play a
central role in obtaining continued funding for QUEST and in
promoting it and protecting it. [IAF organizations] were very careful
not to treat QUEST as a patronage operation or source of jobs for their
members as has happened with some other efforts organized by
community-based groups.
Osterman, supra note 11, at 254.
214. May 20 Meeting, supra note 93.
215. BHALLA ET AL., supra note 61, at 408.
216. Id.
217. Interview with Lydia Tom, supra note 68.
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sometimes serving as a general partner and overseer.2 18 Typically,
Northwest Bronx strategizes and negotiates with the CDCs on
how to implement housing projects, assessing how best to leverage
Northwest Bronx's organizing tactics to achieve the goal.2 1 9 The
CDCs, in turn, hold the contractual arrangements with
government, private parties, and intermediaries to develop and
maintain the properties and projects.220
The development of independent CDCs is just one example of
how Northwest Bronx has chosen to deal with its evolving,
multifaceted relationship with the government. 2 1  As noted,
Northwest Bronx and the independent neighborhood associations
that comprise the coalition also served as neighborhood
preservation consultants to HPD.222 Through the neighborhood
preservation consultant contracts, HPD's intermediary non-profits
like Neighborhood Restore have equipped Northwest Bronx with
the basic technical assistance to survey and assess property
conditions.223 The neighborhood preservation consultant contracts
linked Northwest Bronx and its various components directly with
HPD's bureaucracy. Under these arrangements, Northwest Bronx
organizers participated in identifying and solving street-level
housing problems: organizers gathered data on the conditions of
property, distributed information, negotiated with tenants and
owners, and intervened as representatives of HPD. Through such
programs as the neighborhood preservation consultant contracts
and the CDC initiatives, Northwest Bronx has found itself
increasingly involved in HPD's traditional government business,
all the while garnering power, identifying new problems, and
negotiating with HPD clearer solutions.224
B. Deliberative Possibilities and "Mortgagizing"
HPD and Northwest Bronx have discovered they have
218. Id.
219. Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 83.
220. Id.
221. Throughout this process, Northwest Bronx has learned to maintain its focus
on housing organizing even when incentivized by local and federal housing
authorities to become a landlord and service-provider. Id. Indeed, Northwest
Bronx feared that becoming a landlord would compromise its ability to represent
the interests of its membership and maintain its organizing focus. Id.
222. NPCP List (April 2003) (on file with author).
223. See BHALLA ET AL., supra note 61, at 405 (noting the assistance provided
once buildings are transferred to Neighborhood Restore).
224. See Interview with James Mumm, supra note 185; Interview with Mary
Dailey, supra note 166; Appendix 1.
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overlapping interests; yet, contracts and formal arrangements
have not been the sole vehicle for the development of their
interactions.
Northwest Bronx has led a charge to persuade HPD and
lenders into disciplining problem landlords who refuse to properly
maintain their buildings, a campaign which organizers have
termed "mortgagizing. 225 Similar to the Freddie Mac campaign,
Northwest Bronx argues that the "good repair" clause in mortgage
contracts allows banks to threaten foreclosure for those landlords
who do not maintain their buildings. 226 Presumably, banks are not
eager to be publicly associated with known problem landlords, and
the banks must be concerned about the trouble that CBOs can
cause under the provisions of the Reinvestment Act.
Beyond the issues of the banks' reputations and the
community goodwill that aids them in Reinvestment Act reviews,
the deeper and more fundamental policy concern that Northwest
Bronx has exposed is the possibility that banks have been ignoring
building conditions during a speculative real estate bubble at their
own peril and the peril of the housing finance market. While
inflation-adjusted prices have increased by more than sixty
percent for Bronx multi-family units since 1995, rents have
increased at a much more modest rate.227 However, plummeting
interest rates have allowed financing expenses to remain
relatively constant even as prices and borrowing have soared,
allowing landlords to avoid significant cash flow problems.228 This
creates a precarious situation given that mortgage rates have
already started to rise and are set to rise further.229 Landlords
who have adjustable rate financing will face a cash flow squeeze as
their mortgage expenses rise and the housing market dips. Only
corresponding increases in rent will keep the net operating income
stable, which leaves two unpleasant alternatives. Either rents
will have to rise with mortgage expenses, pricing out those most in
need of affordable housing, or landlords will face pressure to defer
225. Interview with Luisa Pacheco, Housing Organizer, Northwest Bronx, in
New York, NY (Feb. 20, 2004).
226. Id. In 2004, for example, Northwest Bronx lobbied senior executives of
Washington Mutual and held demonstrations outside of senior management
meetings to bring attention to problem landlords whose properties are financed by
the bank. Id.
227. JAMES BUCKLEY & CATHERINE O'LEARY, UNIVERSITY NEIGHBORHOOD
PROGRAM, A REAL ESTATE BUBBLE IN THE BRONX?: A STUDY OF TRENDS IN BRONX
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PRICING, 1985 TO 2001, Appendix Charts 1 & 2 (2003),
available at http://www.unhp.org/pdf/bubble.pdf.
228. See id. at Appendix Chart 3.
229. May 20 Meeting, supra note 125.
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maintenance and tax expenditures in order to maintain the same
net operating income. The available data does little to support the
notion that the rental market in the Bronx can support significant
increases in mortgage expenses. 230  Such insight should be
valuable to lenders and HPD, especially given its anti-
abandonment and prevention mandates.
HPD increasingly is aware of Northwest Bronx's vital role as
a street-level monitor of building conditions and market trends.
One telling example of how HPD acknowledges Northwest Bronx's
importance is HPD's recent interventions on behalf of Northwest
Bronx. Northwest Bronx recently was sued by Stephen Tobia,
alleged owner of various buildings in the Northwest Bronx area,
for trespass, libel, and tortious interference with Tobia's bank
dealings.23' Tobia asserted that Northwest Bronx's tenant
organizing efforts attempted to damage his relationship with HPD
and the banks in the hope that Northwest Bronx may ultimately
assume ownership of the properties. 232 In recent years, Northwest
Bronx began organizing tenants in the various buildings allegedly
held by Tobia's realty companies, but which Northwest Bronx
contends are really owned by Frank Palazzolo, listed as one of
New York City's worst landlords, with the buildings linked to him
having a total of 19,000 violations. 233 Northwest Bronx contacted
the banks, urging them to inspect the properties and force repairs
230. See BUCKLEY & O'LEARY, supra note 227, at 8-9 ("[T]he lowest income
households pay the highest percentage of income on rent."); BHALLA ET AL., supra
note 61, at 315 (noting that the Bronx has the lowest modern household income of
any borough in New York); Michael H. Schill & Glynis Daniels, State of New York
City's Housing and Neighborhoods: An Overview of Recent Trends, Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 5, 12 (June 2003) (discussing financial distress in
the context of tax delinquencies). In a report analyzing data through 2001,
University Neighborhood Preservation Program (UNHP), one of the CDCs created
by Northwest Bronx to manage and finance housing, observed that average rents in
the Bronx were the lowest in New York City, but Bronx residents have the highest
median rent-to-income ratio in the city, which means that Bronx residents spend a
large proportion of their income to maintain a roof over their heads. BUCKLEY &
O'LEARY, supra note 227, at 8. The Bronx has the highest severe rent-to-income
burden with 29.1% of households spending more than fifty percent of their income
on rent. Id. at 9. As of 2002, tax delinquency rates in the Bronx were beginning to
rise after years of decline. See May 20 Meeting, supra note 125. Long-term
property tax delinquencies and high lien-to-value ratios are clear indicators of
potential fiscal distress and property abandonment. Id.
231. Verified Complaint at 4-8, New Line Realty V Corp. v. United Comms. of
Univ. Heights, No. 03-20393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003) (on file with author).
232. Affidavit of Stephen Tobia at 3, [ 5, New Line Realty V Corp. v. United
Comms. Of Univ. Heights, No. 03-20393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9. 2003) (on file with
author).
233. David Gonzalez, The Landlords, or Somebody, Striking Back, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2004, at B1.
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before refinancing their mortgages at a lower rate.2 34 Ultimately,
according to Tobia, Northwest Bronx's efforts forced the lender to
deny Tobia's request to refinance the mortgages at a lower rate.2 35
Northwest Bronx's target was Frank Palazzolo.236 Yet, in his
claim, Tobia alleged that he, not Palazzolo, was sole officer,
shareholder, and director of the property holding corporations. 2 37
According to Tobia, Palazzolo did not have an ownership interest
in the properties but held a pledge of stock of the corporations
based on loans advanced. 238 Tobia further alleged that organizers
for Northwest Bronx held themselves out as representatives of
HPD, without HPD's consent.239
Both HPD and Northwest Bronx insisted that Palazzolo was
the controlling party behind the properties Tobia alleged were his
because Palazzolo represented the realty corporations in dealings
with the banks. 240 HPD, who has sued Palazzolo in the past for
extensive code violations, took the unprecedented step of issuing a
vast subpoena against Palazzolo seeking countless corporate
details related to the properties in order to assess control and
ownership of the realty corporations. 241 HPD submitted affidavits
in support of Northwest Bronx detailing their contractual
relationships, and Michael Bosnick, HPD's Assistant
Commissioner for Anti-Abandonment, has provided statements on
Northwest Bronx's behalf.242
Despite this promising collaboration in bringing information
about problem landlords to the attention of local government and
lenders, and Northwest Bronx's various arrangements and
entanglements with HPD, Northwest Bronx continues to demand
reform. Northwest Bronx is critical of what it deems to be HPD's
lax enforcement of the housing code, of HPD's hesitancy to
coordinate with other city agencies to stop providing rental
subsidies to the worst landlords, and its practice of allowing
problem landlords to sign voluntary repair agreements instead of
234. Id. at B6.
235. Tobia Affidavit, supra note 232, at 17, 38.
236. See Gonzalez, supra note 233, at B6 ("The groups also painted Mr. Palazzolo
as the borough's leading slumlord.").
237. See Verified Complaint, supra note 231, at 3, 5-12; Tobia Affidavit, supra
note 232, at 4, 6.
238. Tobia Affidavit, supra note 232, at 4, 6; see Gonzalez, supra note 233, at
B6 (discussing how Palazzolo helped acquire the property).
239. See Tobia Affidavit, supra note 232, at 6, 1 Ia.
240. Gonzalez, supra note 233, at B6.
241. Id.




C. Deliberative Practices and Code Enforcement's
Incomplete Reform244
1. Overview of HPD's Code Enforcement Rules and Norms
HPD's changing and complex relationship with community
groups and its evolving role as an administrator and regulator
cannot be fully understood without understanding how HPD
executes and enforces the housing code through its Department of
Code Enforcement. Indeed, an overview of its approach to code
enforcement illustrates some of HPD's complicated dealings with
CBO's and its own internal inconsistencies.
The New York City Charter charges HPD with enforcing the
housing maintenance code. The code states:
The sound enforcement of minimum housing standards is
essential: to preserve decent housing; to prevent adequate or
salvageable housing from deteriorating to the point where it
can no longer be reclaimed; and to bring about the basic
decencies and minimal standards of healthful living in already
deteriorated dwellings, which, although no longer salvageable,
must serve as habitations until they can be replaced. 245
Violations of the code are referred to as class "A," "B," or "C"
violations, corresponding to non-hazardous, hazardous, and
immediately hazardous conditions, respectively.246 Once a housing
inspector from HPD determines that there is a violation, HPD
must serve the landlord with a written notice of violation (NOV).
Non-hazardous or "A" violations must be corrected within ninety
days of the NOV.247 Examples of "A" violations include the lack of
a peephole in the entrance door and an improper seat for a water
closet.248 Hazardous or "B" violations must be corrected within
243. May 20 Meeting, supra note 93; Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 83.
Indeed, Northwest Bronx is pursuing an entire new administrative law process
that would allow the city to directly place liens for housing maintenance violations
instead of relying exclusively on housing court litigation. Interview with Mary
Dailey, supra note 83.
244. Much of this Section was obtained from interviews and research conducted
by Douglas Jaffe.
245. N.Y.C., NY, HOUSING MAINTENANCE CODE § 27-2002 (1999), available at
http://www.housingnyc.com/html/resources/hmc/hmc.htm.
246. See id. § 27.2115(d) (mandating the categorization of violations).
247. See id. § 27-2115(c). Failure to correct non-hazardous violations within
ninety days is punishable by a fine often dollars to fifty dollars. Id.
248. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, AUDIT REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT'S ENFORCEMENT OF
THE HOUSING MAINTENANCE CODE (1995), Summary of the Three Classes of
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thirty days of the mailing of the NOV.249 Examples of "B"
violations include inadequate lighting for public areas and
unlawful bars or gates on windows opening to fire escapes.2 50
Immediately hazardous or "C" violations include lack of heat and
hot water, rodents, and peeling lead paint where children reside.2 51
Landlords who have corrected any violation are required to certify
to HPD that the corrections have been made. 2 2
The majority of HPD's code enforcement inspections are in
response to individual tenant complaints.25 3 Tenant complaints
can be registered by calling the city's Citizen Service Initiative or
by calling HPD's hotline. 25 4 Upon receiving a call, an HPD
specialist gives the tenant a complaint number and routes the
complaint to the proper Borough Code Enforcement Office.255
Other complaints are lodged by tenants who complain directly to
the Borough Code Enforcement Office.25 6 In either case, the
Department of Code Enforcement is charged with dispatching an
inspector to the premises to identify violations and write NOVs.25 7
A Tenant Petition Inspection (TPI) is an additional means for
requesting code enforcement action. TPIs have been available to
organized tenants associations and community-based
organizations like Northwest Bronx throughout HPD's history.2 58
While the form changes slightly with each incarnation, generally a
TPI is a tenant petition process initiated by the filing of a
Housing Code Violations 1, available at
http://www.tenant.net/Oversight/Codeenf/codetoc.html [hereinafter 1995 AUDIT].
249. Id. Failure to correct hazardous violations with thirty days is punishable
by a fine of twenty-five dollars to one hundred dollars, plus ten dollars per day for
every day beyond thirty. HOUSING MAINTENANCE CODE § 27-2115(a); § 27-115(c).
250. 1995 AUDIT, supra note 248, at Summary of the Three Classes of Housing
Code Violations 2.
251. ASSOCIATION FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
INEQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT: THE CRISIS OF HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW
YORK CITY 15, available at http://pubadvocate.NYC.gov/policy/pdfsfInequitable
Enforcement_000.pdf. These violations must be corrected within twenty-four hours
or a penalty of $50 to $150, plus $50 to $125 per day that the violation goes
uncorrected. HOUSING MAINTENANCE CODE § 27-115(a); § 27-115(c).
252. 1995 AUDIT, supra note 248, at Summary of the Three Classes of Housing
Code Violations 2.
253. ASSOCIATION FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note
251, at 4.








complaint.259 The petition results in HPD conducting a roof to
cellar inspection of the entire building, as opposed to the more
typical inspection of a single unit for specific violations.2 60 In both
cases there is often disagreement between HPD officials and CBOs
on whether code inspectors should look for and write up violations
not included in the initial complaint.26 ' In a typical inspection,
inspectors are only required to check for the violations reported
and five additional violations: illegal obstructions of fire escapes,
lack of child-proof window guards, doors requiring a key to exit
from the inside, lead-based paint hazards, and smoke-detectors.2 62
Once the NOV is written, it is sent to the building owners who
must correct the violation in the statutorily allotted time.2 63 Once
the violation is remedied, the owner must certify that the repair
has been made.264 When owners fail to make required repairs, the
matter may be referred to HPD's Housing Litigation Division.2 65
The Litigation Division or the tenants may bring an action in
housing court seeking orders forcing the landlord to comply and
make repairs. 266 Throughout this process, DAA is available to
assist landlords with technical matters, financing, and compliance
requirements. 267  Only if conditions become severe and the
landlord is uncooperative does the Litigation Division ask a court
to appoint a receiver to collect rents and operate the building while
necessary repairs are made.26
8
2. The Ongoing Critique
Over the past decade, HPD's code enforcement processes
have been heavily criticized. A series of three reports sheds light
on HPD's continuous code enforcement problems. The first report,
Audit Report of the New York City Department of Housing
259. Id. at 19.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 16.
262. Id. at 15
263. Id. at 15-16.
264. Id. at 16. Code inspectors then have seventy days to perform follow-up
inspections before it is deemed corrected. If the landlord has falsely certified
corrections, then an additional penalty applies. Id. In cases where the violation
requires immediate attention, the Emergency Repair Program (ERP) may be called
upon to execute repairs at the owner's expense. Id. Once HPD's Department of
Finance bills the owners, they have sixty days to make payment before a lien is
placed on the property. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 19.
268. Id. at 16.
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Preservation and Development's Enforcement of the Housing
Maintenance Code, was issued in 1995 by Comptroller Alan
Hevesi, an independently elected city official.269 In June 2002,
Comptroller William C. Thompson issued a follow-up report to
assess the progress made on the recommendations of the Hevesi
audit.27 ° In 2004, the Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development (ANHD), of which Northwest Bronx is a member,
issued another report analyzing HPD's code enforcement
practices.271
The most disturbing finding of the 1995 Audit was that HPD
did not have any procedures in place to measure whether it was
effectively enforcing the code. 272 HPD was tracking the raw
number of inspections conducted and not the outcomes of those
inspections.273  For example, while HPD was measuring the
number of complaints received, inspections performed, and
violations written, it was not tracking basic outcome
measurements. 274  Housing organizers like Northwest Bronx
expected HPD to include in its code enforcement system indicators
such as the percentage of violations corrected and the average
time for correction. 275 When the Comptroller's office surveyed a
sample of immediately hazardous or "C" violations from the prior
year (excluding heat and hot water complaints) only fifty-seven
percent had been corrected.276 The 1995 Audit concluded that
because HPD had no formal process for monitoring the outcome
after violation notices were issued, HPD wasted resources by
continually reinspecting the same properties. 277 Pressured by the
1995 Audit, Northwest Bronx, and other housing groups, HPD
increased reinspections by forty-six percent between 1995 and
2001, from 275,901 to 403,591.278 Furthermore, reinspection rates
of violations, as certified by building owners, increased from
269. 1995 AUDIT, supra note 248.
270. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE HOUSING MAINTENANCE CODE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2002), available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/auditpdf files/mH01_176F.pdf
[hereinafter 2002 FOLLOW-UP REPORT].
271. ASSOCIATION FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note
251.




276. Id. at Findings and Recommendations 10.
277. Id. at Findings and Recommendations 15-16.
278. 2002 FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 270, at 18.
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approximately ten percent in 1995 to 43.7% in fiscal year 2001.279
Even if HPD had adopted the recommendations of the reports to
add better outcome measures, there were additional findings that
pointed to enforcement problems. The owner correction
certification process, for example, was completely inadequate, as
evidenced by a false certification rate of more than twenty-eight
percent.28 0
While not addressed in the Comptroller's office audits, the
ANHD report also looked at disparities in enforcement patterns
across neighborhoods. 28 1 The ANHD report found that while other
boroughs were experiencing decreases in the number of
maintenance deficiencies per building, the Bronx saw an increase
of 13.4%.282 The report described HPD's failure to adopt a
systemic and targeted enforcement regime to preserve housing
quality across all neighborhoods, 28 3 specifically criticizing its lack
of systemic approaches to a) ensure uniform enforcement
throughout the city and b) deal with problem landlords who have
histories of multiple buildings with many uncorrected violations.
28 4
Northwest Bronx organizers argued that code enforcement failures
should be of great concern to anti-abandonment officials at HPD,
279. Id. While significant increases in reinspection helped in assessing
outcomes, HPD's published indicators still did not provide an accurate picture of
code enforcement outcomes. The reason for this, as explained in the 1995 audit,
was that HPD had many violations from previous years in its database and
reinspections could clear old violations as well as current ones. See 1995 AUDIT,
supra note 248, at Findings and Recommendations 15-16. It was impossible,
therefore, to tell how many removed violations were recently issued violations
versus years-old violations that were removed during new inspections.
280. ASSOCIATION FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note
251, at 22-23. Owners who falsely certified corrections were not significantly
deterred due to low rates of prosecution and insubstantial penalties. False
certification carried a penalty of no more than $250 above the normal accumulation
of daily fines for uncorrected hazardous violations. The 1995 recommendation to
increase penalties, as of today, has not been acted on by the New York City Council.
The ANHD report also found HPD's fine collection practices to be inadequate.
While HPD publishes the amount of fines it collects, it does not publish the amount
of uncollected fines. HLD pursues litigation in order to adjudicate fines under the
Housing Maintenance Code. As a result of low staffing numbers at HLD only some
violators are pursued. Moreover, ANHD found that HPD collects only fifty percent
of the fines awarded in default judgments. While housing departments in other
cities, and other departments in New York City government, have the capacity to
administratively adjudicate fines for violations, the state legislature has resisted
calls to grant HPD such authority. While inadequate HPD reporting masks the
size of this enforcement problem, clearly the cost of litigating uncorrected violations
in housing court is a significant obstacle to enforcement. Id.





particularly given the possibility of a bursting real estate bubble
and rising interest rates.285  Code enforcement was not only
essential for HPD to preserve its mandate as regulator, but as the
shift toward anti-abandonment and, elimination of the in rem stock
took place, code enforcement became an important source of
information for DAA.286 For CBOs like Northwest Bronx,
indicators of code violations are currency to track building
conditions and are the only tangible evidence of delinquency that
they can use in housing court.287
For HPD officials, however, housing code violations might be
viewed as simply another data point in determining which
buildings should undergo assessment. On one view, once DAA is
aware that a building is distressed, writing additional violations is
a needless expenditure of resources.288 Under HPD's recent anti-
abandonment focused strategy, housing code violations were not
essential for HPD to meet its goals. 28 9 In fact, Northwest Bronx
housing leaders have pointed out that HPD has decades-old open
violations in its system that have never been closed because there
is no effective process to clear violations as they are remedied. 90
HPD instead has relied on the building assessments performed by
DAA inspectors to determine the course of action for particular
properties. 291 As is apparent from its code enforcement practices,
HPD is still learning how to integrate its various parts.
3. Elaborating New Code Enforcement Norms
Given HPD's incomplete restructuring, Northwest Bronx
285. May 20 Meeting, supra note 125.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see ASSOCIATION FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 251, at 21.
288. Interview with Jerilyn Perine, supra note 64. In the 1995 Audit, HPD was
criticized for repeatedly inspecting and writing the same NOVs without getting the
underlying condition corrected. 1995 AUDIT, supra note 248, at Findings and
Recommendations 15-16. In one example, the auditors found the same condition
was inspected and NOVs were written fourteen times over a four and a half year
period. Id.
289. May 20 Meeting, supra note 125.
290. Id.
291. Interview with Jerilyn Perine, supra note 64; Interview with Michael
Bosnick, supra note 62; May 20 Meeting, supra note 125; see also Northwest Bronx
Community and Clergy Coalition, Background on Northwest Bronx Proposal Re:
TPIs, presented to Shaun Donovan, HPD Commissioner at meeting with Northwest
Bronx housing leaders (May 27, 2004) ("Northwest Bronx's experience shows that
the Division of Anti-Abandonment is most effective when working with cooperative,
well-intentioned owners... DAA involvement in buildings with poor conditions is
ineffective at best... and damaging at worst .. ") (on file with the author).
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continues to pressure HPD to re-evaluate and revise its policies.
In 2004 at a meeting with HPD, Northwest Bronx introduced a
plan to address the inadequate enforcement of TPIs. The proposal
stressed that HPD should grant code enforcement inspections at
the request of tenant associations and community groups, that all
code enforcement TPIs include dismissal of cured violations in
addition to documentation of new ones, and that community
groups be allowed to provide DAA lists of good or fair buildings
with backlogs of old violations.292
HPD responded with a community-driven TPI plan of its
own. HPD proposed an inspection system where CBOs would
identify buildings and conduct initial assessments, collecting
survey forms as part of the assessment.293 DAA then would visit
identified buildings and re-survey the properties.2 94 DAA would
make outreach attempts to landlords offering voluntary repair
agreements.295 If after some time, subject to DAA discretion, DAA
determined that the owner was not cooperating, the building
would be referred to the Department of Code Enforcement. 2 96 A
team of inspectors from the Department of Code Enforcement
would visit the building and cite violations.2 97 The inspectors
would prioritize "C" violations and would write notice of "B" and
"A" violations at the tenants' insistence. 298 Inspectors would use
TPIs as opportunities to conduct dismissal requests to remove old
violations. 299
While Northwest Bronx approved of certain measures
outlined in HPD's TPI proposal, it also identified various
problems. 3 0 According to Northwest Bronx, HPD's proposal would
treat all owners the same, regardless of the owner's track
record. 30 1 Northwest Bronx insisted that buildings assessed as fair
or poor be automatically referred to the Department of Code
Enforcement if the owner was a known delinquent 02 Northwest
Bronx maintained that while DAA and CBOs could assist owners
in fixing problems during this period, TPIs should not be













deferred.303 Northwest Bronx argued that DAA was often too
lenient with owners, in particular in disregarding HPD's own code
enforcement criteria in building ratings.304 Organizers observed
that DAA's involvement often resulted in repair and code
enforcement delays, frustrating organizing efforts in the
bargain.305
To substantiate its critique, Northwest Bronx tracked the
compliance history of particular buildings to demonstrate how the
DAA's and Code Enforcement's involvement in monitoring
buildings with extensive code violations was "ineffective at best"
and "damaging at worst."30 6 One example was 4301 Park Avenue
in the Bronx. 307 Northwest Bronx began organizing tenants in this
building in February of 2002. Organizers found leaks, falling
ceilings, and an unlocked front door, and categorized the building
conditions as poor.308 Northwest Bronx requested a TPI.309 The
building's tenant association further requested assistance from
Washington Mutual, the mortgage holder, and the Department of
Code Enforcement.310 The DAA's own evaluation determined that
the building was in fair condition and that there was no need for
Code Enforcement intervention.3 11 It concluded that the building
did not need a TPI. 312 Washington Mutual conducted three
inspections of its own in the spring of 2003.313 The Washington
Mutual inspections resulted in certain roof repair work. Although
Northwest Bronx requested a TPI, the Department of Code
Enforcement did not intervene except for certain court-ordered
code inspections. 314 As of 2005, the building had seen some
repairs, but tenants and organizers continue to insist that the
work is incomplete and inconsistent.31 5
To Northwest Bronx organizers, it is clear that HPD, lenders,
and tenants all have benefited from thorough documentation of
















however, HPD's own system produced a database of code
violations which was not a precise tool for evaluating overall
building conditions. Rather, it was at best a patchwork of DAA
building assessments that sometimes accurately pictured building
conditions but did not carry the legal force of a code violation.3 16
Northwest Bronx thus has insisted that HPD create a more precise
and comprehensive accounting system of building conditions, a
system in which stakeholders like Northwest Bronx would play an
important role.317
Recently, Northwest Bronx and other community-based
groups negotiated a comprehensive inspection program which
integrates elements of both the CBO and government plans. In
February 2005, after various negotiations, a coalition of housing
advocates led by ANHD and community groups including
Northwest Bronx reached a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with HPD.318
The MOU, authorized by the HPD Commissioner and the
New York City Council Speaker, provides that within each City
Council District buildings would be selected for building-wide
inspections. 31 9 A building would be designated for inspection
based on class "B" and "C" violations per unit, outstanding fines
and/or whether it has been assessed in "poor condition" by HPD. 20
HPD would provide the list of selected buildings to the Council
Member or the designated CBO.321 The MOU gives the City
Council Member and designated CBOs two weeks to narrow the
list to "fifteen buildings containing a maximum of 200 units that
warrant a building-wide inspection."322 After the CBO and City
Council Member designate the buildings, HPD authorities and the
City Council Member discuss the identified buildings.3 23 HPD
then schedules a meeting with the City Council staff and CBO to
316. May 20 Meeting, supra note 125.
317. Id.
318. The MOU was not officially authorized until July 18, 2005. Memorandum of
Understanding Between Council Members and Designated Not-For-Profit
Community groups and HPD (Jan. 25, 2005) (draft) (hereinafter Jan. 25 MOU) (on
file with the author).
319. Id.
320. "Poor condition" refers to buildings that "a) show evidence of abandonment
or long-term neglect, usually accompanied by major replacement and/or repair







finalize the list.324 Under the policy, DAA gathers data on the
landlords using city-wide databases to determine ownership
history.325 HPD, the City Council Member and the CBO then
jointly coordinate the inspection.326
After the inspection, informed by the City Council member's
and CBO's recommendations, HPD's Building Treatment Team
evaluates the results and consider appropriate next steps.3 27
Owners have three months to remedy eighty percent of all
violations. 328 If that threshold is not met, unless there is a
compelling reason against it, the DAA will refer the case to the
Building Treatment Team for litigation review.3 29 The MOU
stipulates that HPD must present to the New York City Mayor
and the City Council an annual report assessing the status of the
building-wide inspection program*330
Although the MOU successfully integrates many of
Northwest Bronx's code compliance demands, it leaves open many
questions as to how the different parties will coordinate their
efforts and who ultimately will be accountable for the program's
successful execution. 331 At a minimum, this program will result in
even greater interaction between HPD and CBOs like Northwest
Bronx. The policy has the potential of further integrating the
many divisions that form HPD and of generating multiple
indicators of building conditions. Having access to more pooled
indicators will allow both HPD bureaucrats and CBOs a more
comprehensive review of housing problems, which could result in
an entirely new system of compliance. In order to effectively
gather useful and material information, HPD and Northwest
Bronx are likely to undergo further internal reforms. HPD's
Division of Code Enforcement, DAA, and the Litigation Division
will have to coordinate their efforts more systematically across
divisions and levels in order to accommodate their new roles.




327. Id. HPD's Building Treatment Team is comprised of HPD's Division of




331. According to Mary Dailey, HPD, in conjunction with ANHD, would train the
community groups and HPD inspectors on their new roles. Interview with Mary




have been at the forefront of the negotiations, will have to more
fully involve the common member into this comprehensive street-
level monitoring process. Given the many open questions, the
negotiations between HPD and Northwest Bronx are likely to be
ongoing, inducing deliberative and continuous revisions of the new
norms.
IV. Toward a New Model of Public Administration and
Local Problem-Solving
HPD's and Northwest Bronx's ongoing transformation
demonstrates a break with many of the elements that had defined
these institutions. During the 1970s and 1980s under the old
model of command-and-control public administration, HPD
became New York City's biggest landlord and Northwest Bronx, by
organizing dissatisfied tenants, emerged as one of HPD's biggest
critics. 332 Both institutions had to change, both internally and
externally, in order to effectively deal with the housing problem.
Neither institution was equipped to deal with the problem on its
own.
In the 1990s HPD divested itself of its housing stock and
turned to prevention as the means of solving the property
abandonment problem. HPD's transformation was instigated by
the crisis in its command-and-control system of public
administration manifest in the wave of property abandonment and
arson in the Bronx of the 1970s and 1980s. HPD's hierarchical
control of the buildings it owned gave way to a new system of early
detection and prevention of deterioration in privately owned
housing. This new system relies on local, street-level information
pooled by seasoned community-based organizations like Northwest
Bronx with a trajectory of building neighborhood-based,
countervailing power. Without the CBOs' constant feedback, HPD
cannot meet its anti-abandonment, prevention, and code
enforcement goals. There are various formal arrangements that
facilitate feedback from the grassroots to the government agency.
These formal arrangements are accompanied by community-
organized actions that monitor and pressure government. As a
result, HPD has reluctantly come to rely on grassroots
organizations, which historically have organized and mobilized
communities to demand better government services, to coordinate
its efforts, and to assist HPD in developing effective policies.




neighborhood-based knowledge and became an authority on
housing reform. No longer was power seen, in the Alinsky
tradition, as zero-sum. As Northwest Bronx acquired more
authority, and developed a more elaborate relationship with HPD
and a more sophisticated membership base, its tactics evolved
from short-term, confrontational actions and "hits" to more
complex and sustainable organizing. Northwest Bronx's evolved
organizing model and approach to targets and partners attempt to
balance both conflict and cooperation in novel ways.3 33 This
dynamic has not created a one way flow of information. On the
contrary, Northwest Bronx's conflictual participation in public
problem-solving has allowed it to strengthen "the community's
informational hand."334 Indeed, government's hesitant openness to
Northwest Bronx's participation has allowed Northwest Bronx to
build a stronger membership as the leaders witness more
measurable and realistic results from their efforts.335
Throughout the last decades Northwest Bronx and HPD have
been in constant contact. HPD was always one of Northwest
Bronx's targets. To HPD, however, at least in the beginning,
Northwest Bronx was simply a loud critic. Today both are fully
aware of one another as they are linked in various ways and on
multiple levels, and the distinction between the roles of the
government agency and the CBO are increasingly difficult to draw.
HPD and Northwest Bronx are engaged in symbiotic dealings
which involve continuous, public "learning and reconstruction" of
norms which are likely to generate even more elaborate
entanglements and complex interdependence 36
Governance systems, such as the one being developed by
HPD and Northwest Bronx, that pool local information to develop
context-specific solutions to particular problems and to improve
the system for detecting and correcting problems, have been called
experimentalist. Typically, they emerge in settings such as the
administration of housing in the Northwest Bronx, where
333. According to Mary Dailey, this is a certain stage of organizational
development for these types of grassroots organizations:
As an organization wins and has a host of relationships in play, it has a lot
to lose. Every time that the organization complains or critiques its former
targets (now allies or partners) it puts a relationship at risk. The heart of
success is getting this balance right, ensuring that risks are taken on clear
matters of principle and that the organization never puts too many
relationships at risk simultaneously.
Interview with Mary Daily, supra note 200.
334. See Karkkainen, supra note 81, at 317.
335. Interview with Mary Dailey, supra note 200.
336. Id.; see Sabel & Simon, supra note 13, at 1019.
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command-and-control methods have incontrovertibly failed. In
many cases, changes in the direction of experimentalist solutions,
such as the ones experienced by the housing sector in New York
City, have been prompted by impact public law litigation.337 In
the present case, however, Northwest Bronx and other grassroots
organizations, not public law litigation, have been instrumental in
instigating, directing, and molding HPD's policies. Perhaps public
law litigation was unnecessary because the crisis literally
overwhelmed the local government, giving it no choice but to
undertake a profound re-organization. Once that process began,
HPD discovered that Northwest Bronx's members are
stakeholders with a direct interest in the success of affordable
rental housing and the advantage of neighborhood-level insight
and experience. Indeed, these actions involve the continuous
distribution of information and, consequently, of capacity to
ordinary citizens, which are then better equipped to assist
government in detecting patterns of misinformation and
inaccuracies. Wary collaboration once begun was reinforced by
demonstrable, material success. Whatever the exact cause, the
outcome is that Northwest Bronx is directly involved in co-
managing possible solutions, whereas community based groups
have seldom, if ever, played this kind of active role in reform when
it was initiated by public law litigation.
The co-evolution of HPD and Northwest Bronx demonstrates
that community-based organizations, as sites for local stakeholder
participation, are no longer just identifying problems and
demanding immediate government intervention 38 Specifically,
337. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 13, at 1021-53 (describing the role of public
law litigation in generating experimentalist practices in the areas of education,
mental health, prisons, police, and housing). Sabel and Simon also describe "public
law litigation" as "civil rights advocacy seeking to restructure public agencies." Id.
at 1016.
338. See MEDIRATTA, supra note 6, at 40-43. The NYU Institute for Education
and Social Policy, for example, surveyed CBOs that focused on education
organizing and examined the effect of organizing on public goals. Id. at 3. The
NYU study looked at the following community based organizations: Austin
Interfaith (AI); Chicago ACORN; Community Coalition for Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment (CC), Los Angeles; Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing
Project (EPOP); Milwaukee Inner-city Congregations Allied for Hope (MICAH); the
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (Northwest Bronx); Oakland
Community Organizations; and People Acting For Community Together (PACT),
Miami. Id. The study found that in the short-term, school reform organizing
improved the CBO's membership base, visibility, knowledge, and social capital. Id.
at 41, Figure 2. At the school and district level, in the short term, education
organizing "increased system responsiveness to community pressure, [allowed for]
more flexible and transparent administrative procedures, and increased scrutiny of
the system by local politics and the media." Id. at 40. In the intermediate term,
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Alinsky-style grassroots organizations, which historically have
been instrumental in demanding reform and public accountability
through adversarial means, can collaborate, in such evolving
relationships, with government institutions in new ways, while
maintaining their own independent and critical practices-
developing new forms of accountability. Such collaboration and
attempts at coordination involve both formal arrangements with
local government but also informal negotiations and pressure
tactics. CBOs have community insight into public problems to
which government does not have access. As street-level monitors
then, community organizations assist in preserving the adequacy
of public goods and services by tracking early warning indicators
and by tackling problems at the source rather than leaving them
to be corrected at the "the end of the pipe," when often government
has lacked the capacity to solve and contain the problem. Indeed,
as strategic allies, organizations like Northwest Bronx are
increasingly co-participants with government in identifying and
solving public problems. Northwest Bronx has gone beyond
developing countervailing power. The organization arguably has
taken on certain roles of those in "official" power. Thus, it is not
clear that this Northwest Bronx can still be categorized as a pure
Ainsky organization.
Throughout this ongoing process, CBOs like Northwest Bronx
have faced the challenge of preserving their original critical
methods. The new relationship with government is not solely
contractual. It encompasses an array of both conflict-driven and
collaborative arrangements.3 39  As Northwest Bronx well
understands, purely contractual relationships run the risk of
completely demobilizing a grassroots organization's political
activism. 340  Given this complex relationship, grassroots
organizing increased the influence, leadership capacity, and sophistication of the
CBO. Id. at 41, Figure 2. Simultaneously at the school and district level, there was
greater distribution of school and district-level performance data, staff and student
attendance, and school-based responsiveness to the CBO and the community. Id. at
51, Appendix 3. In the long-term, education organizing developed the parents', the
community's, and CBO's ability to support and develop systemic school reform,
complemented at the school and district level with improved education inputs and
greater school capacity. Id. at 41, Figure 2. The study found that through this
process, CBOs developed their capacity to advocate for change while contributing to
public reform. Id. at 43.
339. For a review of "publicization" and how the state delegates to private actors,
through contractual relationships, what at one point were public services, see Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV.
1285 (2003). For an example of this contractual relationship, see the discussion of
the neighborhood preservation consultant program, supra Section I.B.
340. See MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING
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organizations like Northwest Bronx, with a trajectory of principled
organizing and a focus on leadership development, are well
positioned to influence and inform public output and regulation, as
now they have a seat at the table with public administrators and
preserve a structural independence from the government
bureaucracy. 341 This new engagement signals a possible move
toward a new form of local public administration with grassroots
organizations playing an integral and novel role in governance.3 42
This new approach to governance and local problem-solving is
promising, though many questions remain. As demonstrated by
Northwest Bronx's and HPD's ongoing code enforcement
negotiations, the transformation to an entirely new system of
governance is incomplete. Moreover, internally, both Northwest
Bronx and HPD are experiencing their own organizational
inconsistencies as they attempt to fully integrate their evolving
practices and keep up with their changing roles and identities.
Northwest Bronx must develop new forms of collaboration with a
government agency which is itself experiencing dramatic and
uncertain organizational changes, which are often subject to the
whims of local politics. And the challenge of this fragile
collaboration is heightened by Northwest Bronx's need, as a
grassroots, largely volunteer organization, to fully integrate its
diverse membership base into its evolving relationships with
targets and partners.
On an expansive reading, then, the story told here suggests
that community-based organizations like Northwest Bronx are
enlarging the agenda of community organizing: moving grassroots
organizations beyond demanding public sector reform and
intervention and towards a novel form of conflictual participation
in the design, revision, and implementation of the policies and
regulations of local government, while moving local government to
more directly involve stakeholder citizens in problem-solving. On
the evidence presented here, the paradox of the promise of
collaboration is that the outcome of many conflicts will decide
DEMOCRACY: How AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC,
224-26 (2002).
341. For an illustration of how the Texas Industrial Areas Foundation, a
traditional Alinsky organization, has shifted its organizing methodology from
adversarial to a more collaborative model, see MARK WARREN, DRY BONES
RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVITALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001).
342. See generally, James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory
Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal




whether it is fulfilled.
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Appendix 1:
The diagram illustrates some of the ways HPD and
Northwest Bronx are linked.
Tax Assistance
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Appendix 2: Deliverables.
Building surveys: DAA borough offices will give
Neighborhood Preservation Consultants [NPCs] a standard
building survey form to complete for buildings provided by DAA.
This form will be counted as a deliverable when it is completed. In
addition, NPCs may survey buildings that DAA did not give them,
but they must first get approval from the DAA borough office
director or the director's designee if they want to claim
reimbursement for those buildings. The original building
assessment form should be sent directly to the borough office, and
a copy should be attached to the quarterly program report and
voucher which are submitted to the central NPC Unit at 100 Gold
Street.
Loan applications: Reimbursement will be given for each
owner referred by an NPC to the DAA borough office in those cases
where a complete loan application along with all required
documentation is submitted to the private lender and/or HPD.
Alternatively, loans processed directly by an NPC can be approved
for funding after discussion with the DAA borough office director
or the director's designee. To receive reimbursement, a copy of the
cover form of the signed application should be attached to the
quarterly program report and voucher which are submitted to the
central NPC Unit at 100 Gold Street. Where the referral does not
result in a loan application, the NPC can claim reimbursement
under "Short-Term Intervention" or as "Long-Term Interventions,"
as appropriate.
Voluntary Repair Agreements (VRA): The process by which
owners are recommended to DAA by an NPC for a VRA will result
in reimbursement to the NPC if DAA executes a signed agreement.
NPCs who want to sign a VRA directly should contact their DAA
borough office director or the director's designee for approval.
HPD will monitor all VRAs but NPCs may also participate in
monitoring based on discussions with the director or the director's
designee. To receive reimbursement for VRAs, a copy of the signed
VRA should be attached to the quarterly program report and
voucher submitted to the central NPC Unit at 100 Gold Street.
Workshops: Owner or tenant workshops related to housing
issues will be reimbursed. To receive payment, the NPC must list
attendees, and whether the attendees are owners or tenants, or
their program reports. Reimbursement will vary based on
whether there are 25 or more attendees, 15-24, or less than 15.
Mailings: At least 2000 pieces of mail discussing HPD and
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NPC services must be mailed each year.
Short-Term Interventions: Short-term interventions include
any contact with an owner or tenant where advice or counseling is
offered.
Long-Term Interventions: Long-term interventions consist of
work with an owner or tenant which extends over several
telephone or in-person contacts to resolve issues related to
Housing Court, to complete a loan application not using HPD
funds or to complete work to resolve other issues related to HRA
[Human Resources Administration] rent subsidies, DOF
[Department of Finance] finance issues, DEP [Department of
Environmental Protection] water charge issues, etc. To receive
payment, a short description of the issue has to be submitted as
part of the programmatic report, and this description must give
information concerning how the issue was resolved.
Special Projects: NPCs may ask to undertake a special
project, which they would like to do beyond the seven deliverables,
listed above. Before they commence such a project, they should
discuss with the borough director whether reimbursement will be
made for the project.
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